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“Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to 
waive, their rights under [the Family and Medical Leave Act].”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although the language in the above regulation appears to prohibit 
employees from waiving their rights under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), state and federal courts have recently wrestled with 
the meaning of the phrase.  Some courts have come to the conclusion 
that it allows employee waivers in severance agreements.2  The Fourth 
Circuit and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal are currently split on the issue 
of FMLA waivers, and debate continues over the exact meaning of the 
phrase and what interpretation best serves the purposes and goals of the 
FMLA.3 
 1. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007) (implementing regulations under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000)). 
 2. See, e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 does not prohibit waiver of FMLA rights); Schoenwald 
v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., No. 98-35195, 1999 WL 685954, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 1999) 
(holding FMLA claim foreclosed due to employee’s ratification of a release); Simonton 
v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., No. 05-6123-CV-SJ-FJG, 2006 WL 3386564, at 
*3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2006) (finding no impediment to a release agreement). 
 3. See Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2005), aff’d 
on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. 
Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539); Faris, 332 F.3d at 321 (holding waivers enforceable). 
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In the FMLA, Congress enacted the first national family and medical 
leave legislation in the United States.4  It was passed in response to both 
the increasing number of households in which single parents or both 
parents worked, and the lack of employment policies to accommodate 
the parents.5  This reality put parents in the undesirable position of a 
forced choice between job security and parenting.6  Thus, the Act requires 
employers with over fifty employees to provide eligible employees7 up 
to twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year (1) to care for a newborn, a 
newly adopted child, or a newly placed foster child; (2) to care for a 
child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition; or (3) to treat 
one’s own serious health condition.8  Along with these substantive leave 
rights, the Act also created proscriptive rights prohibiting employers 
from discriminating or retaliating against employees when they return 
from leave or otherwise exercise their substantive FMLA rights.9 
The text of the FMLA does not explicitly permit or forbid employees 
to waive their rights to pursue or settle potential claims under the Act.10  
Congress has, however, directed the Secretary of Labor to issue 
regulations necessary to carry out the statute,11 which the Department of 
Labor (DOL) promulgated in 1995 in section 825 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.12  Section 825.220(d) in the Regulations addresses protection 
of employees who requested leave or asserted rights under the FMLA, 
stating that “[e]mployees cannot waive, nor may employers induce 
 4. Jane Waldfogel, Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000 Surveys, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 2001, at 17, 17. 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000). 
 6. Id. 
 7. An “eligible employee” is generally one who has been employed for at least 
twelve months by the employer from whom leave is requested, and has worked at least 
1250 hours for that employer during the previous twelve-month period.  The Act does 
not cover certain federal officers or employees, or employees at a worksite at which the 
employer employs less than fifty employees if the total number of employees employed 
by the employer within seventy-five miles of that worksite is less than fifty.  Id. § 
2611(2). 
 8. Id. § 2612(a)(1).  Additional substantive rights also include the right to take 
leave on an intermittent basis or to a reduced work schedule when medically necessary, 
and the right to reinstatement.  Id. §§ 2612(b), 2614(a). 
 9. Id. § 2615. 
 10. Id. §§ 2601–54; Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 369 (4th Cir. 
2005), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 
3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000) (authorizing the Secretary to prescribe such 
regulations as are necessary to carry out the FMLA). 
 12. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100–825.800 (2007). 




employees to waive, their rights under [the] FMLA.”13  As previously 
noted, judicial interpretations of the regulation have been inconsistent.14  
The Fifth Circuit allowed such a release in Faris v. Williams WPC-I, 
Inc., distinguishing FMLA “rights” from “claims,”15 while other courts 
have drawn no such distinction and allow employees to pursue redress 
for alleged violations despite agreeing to not do so as part of a severance 
agreement.16  As the United States Supreme Court and Congress have 
not yet spoken on this issue, the enforceability of FMLA waivers in 
employee severance agreements will continue to be questioned and 
litigated, and will lead to uncertainty in the context of employer-
employee rights under the Act.17 
 13. Id. § 825.220(d). 
 14. Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-2336, 2006 WL 2529632, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2006) (holding waivers of rights to sue for FMLA violations are 
unenforceable), vacated, 2007 WL 1165068, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).  But cf. 
Halvorson v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 99-5021, 2000 WL 571933, at *3 (6th Cir. May 3, 
2000) (enforcing general release of FMLA, Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
and Americans with Disabilities Act claims). 
 15. 332 F.3d 316, 320–22 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding prohibition on waiving “rights” 
refers to prospective substantive rights under FMLA, not to causes of action for 
exercising those rights or for money damages). 
 16. See, e.g., Dougherty, 2006 WL 2529632, at *7 (denying motion for summary 
judgment on grounds that FMLA rights are not waivable in a severance agreement); 
Dierlam v. Wesley Jessen Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(invalidating severance agreement waiver of FMLA rights). 
 17. In response to various concerns, in February 2006 the DOL requested public 
comment regarding the effectiveness of the FMLA implementing regulations.  Request 
for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,504, 
69,504–05 (Dec. 1, 2006).  The nonexhaustive list of issues for which the DOL sought 
comment included “whether a limitation should be placed on the ability of employees to 
settle their past FMLA claims,” or the waiver issue.  Id. at 69,509–10.  Comments were 
initially due February 2, 2007.  Id. at 69,505.  In February 2008, the DOL proposed new 
FMLA rules and again requested public comment.  The Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7876 (Feb. 11, 2008); see also infra note 118. 
  One of the most hotly debated issues included in the notice was the meaning of 
a “serious health condition,” which is required to take leave under the Act.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000).  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce wants to narrow the 
eligible medical conditions and require more documentation regarding the health 
condition.  Molly Selvin, Family Leave Act Being Reviewed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at 
C1.  As one lawyer put it, some employees view the FMLA as a “‘get out of jail free’ 
card on attendance issues.”  Id.  The National Partnership for Women and Families, on 
the other hand, believes that toughening the law will make it harder for people with 
legitimate medical needs to take leave.  Id.  The group cautions that “[w]e need to be 
careful not to address discipline problems through regulation.”  Cindy Skrzycki, Door 
Opens to Changes in Family Leave, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2006, at D01.  For more on 
the argument that changing the regulations is unnecessary, see John E. Matejkovic & 
Margaret E. Matejkovic, If It Ain’t Broke . . . Changes to FMLA Regulations Are Not 
Needed; Employee Compliance and Employer Enforcement of Current Regulations Are, 
42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 413 (2006).  The DOL may or may not take any action in 
response to the public input.  According to Victoria Lipnic, Assistant Secretary for the 
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While various arguments suggest that FMLA waivers are best 
analyzed as valid private contracts,18 many public policy concerns 
caution against this blanket enforcement.19  Employees asserting their 
FMLA rights are often facing family or medical crises, which may make 
them particularly emotionally and financially vulnerable.20  Studies also 
show that many employees are not familiar with their FMLA rights, and 
may, to their detriment, waive rights to pursue claims they did not realize 
existed.21  Also, allowing employers to purchase waivers of their past 
violations, which were possibly flagrant and harmful, only encourages 
employers to ignore the Act and fosters a contentious workplace.22  
After years of congressional debate and overcoming two presidential 
vetoes, Congress surely did not intend to allow employers to 
systematically violate FMLA provisions intended to aid the nation’s 
23
Employment Standards Administration of the DOL, “The point is to force some critical 
t” principles and a general preference for dispute 
mployees by employers, and 
c i
blem, and from constant pressure to maintain 
cc
om of contract principles which 
ights for fear of 
ily Leave Legislation Increased 
thinking on a lot of issues.”  Skrzycki, supra. 
 18. See infra Part III for discussion of arguments in favor of FMLA waivers, 
including “freedom of contrac
settlement rather than litigation. 
 19. Examples of these concerns include the high risk of employees’ unequal 
bargaining power as to their employer, coercion of e
en ourag ng employers’ noncompliance with the FMLA. 
 20. For instance, an employee who requests leave to attend to a child’s serious 
medical condition has likely been juggling doctors’ appointments, hospital visits, and 
around-the-clock care with work responsibilities for some time prior to the request for 
leave.  Doctor and hospital bills have likely accumulated, and the employee fears the 
impact of lost wages during leave.  The employee is also emotionally drained from 
worrying about the child’s medical pro
a eptable performance levels at work. 
 21. See infra Part III. This is contrary to freed
require “perfect” information, as discussed in Part III. 
 22. Consider the situation where an employer illegally refuses to reinstate an 
employee returning from leave to a position comparable to the one previously held.  The 
employer instead persuades her after two months to accept a severance agreement in 
which the employer pays her two months’ salary in exchange for a contractual promise 
to not pursue any claims against the employer.  After obtaining the waiver, the employer 
is emboldened in realizing it can easily purchase waivers of FMLA liability from its 
employees.  The employer no longer intends to comply with certain provisions of the Act 
which the employer believes are too favorable to employees.  Other employees in the 
workplace witnessed the employer’s FMLA violation, and empathized with the former 
employee as she complained for two months of her maltreatment.  These employees now 
have a growing hostility toward the employer because they blame it for the employee’s 
departure, as well as for their own reluctance to now assert FMLA r
being “pushed out” of their job.  The result is tension in the workplace. 
 23. The Act was vetoed twice by former President George H.W. Bush, but signed 
into law by President Clinton.  Charles L. Baum, Has Fam
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s Comment addresses whether a waiver of rights in an employee 
se
II.  HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE FMLA 
The enactment of the FMLA in 
sp
agreements allays concerns of employee coercion and exploitation by 
employers, encourages FMLA compliance, and promotes the stability 
and economic security of families by enabling employees to reap the 
benefits of the Act. 
Thi
verance agreement which bars an employee from pursuing FMLA 
claims against an employer should be a valid and enforceable contract 
provision.  Part II examines the history and purposes of the FMLA, 
which give rise to public policy arguments against FMLA severance 
agreement waivers.  Part III explores some of the arguments that have 
been offered in support of FMLA waivers, and the various shortcomings 
of these purported justifications.  Part IV turns to the many arguments 
against enforceability, and principally the “anti-waiver approach” which 
would make FMLA waivers illegal.  Finally, Part V concludes that the 
anti-waiver approach should be adopted, or, in the alternative, that 
waivers should be enforceable only after the agreement is scrutinized by 
a court or the Secretary of Labor, or the waiver meets heightened and 
explicit waiver requirements.  The FMLA reflects that it is “neither fair 
nor necessary to ask working Americans to choose between their jobs 
and their families.”24  The approaches offered in this Comment would 
encourage FMLA compliance by not allowing employers to easily 
contract around their obligations under the Act—obligations which are 
vital to ensuring that employers do not force employees to make unfair 
and unnecessary choices between what are often the two most important 
aspects of their lives. 
1993 brought the United States “up to 
eed” with the many other industrialized nations which already had 
national family and medical leave programs.25  The Act reflected 
 
Leave-Taking?, 15 W . U. J.L. & P ’  93, 94 (2004). ASH     OL Y
 24. Statement on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 50, 51 (Feb. 5, 1993) [hereinafter Clinton Signing Statement]. 
 25. See Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 17 (noting that pre-FMLA, the United States 
was an outlier among industrialized countries in that it had no national family and 
medical leave legislation).  President Clinton welcomed the legislation in his signing 
statement accompanying the FMLA and noted that it was “long overdue”: “Now, with 
the signing of this bill, American workers in all 50 states will enjoy the same rights as 
workers in other nations.”  Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 24, at 51.  However, 
the United States may still be an outlier in the international community because over 120 
countries provide paid parental leave, whereas the FMLA does not.  Press Release, Int’l 
Labour Org., More than 120 Nations Provide Paid Maternal Leave (Feb. 16, 1998), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/ 
Press_releases/lang--en/WCMS_008009/index.htm. 
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congressional findings that the number of households in which the single 
parent or both parents worked was significantly increasing.26  Congress 
was particularly concerned with these societal changes given that “it is 
important for the development of children and the family unit that 
fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing and the 
care of family members who have serious health conditions.”27  Congress 
found that the lack of adequate employment policies to accommodate 
working parents forced a choice between job security and parenting, and 
that primary caretaking responsibilities often fell upon women, thus 
affecting the working lives of women more so than those of men.28  As 
for individuals, it was noted that employees who were temporarily 
prevented from working due to serious health conditions also faced 
inadequate job security.29  In light of these findings, Congress set out to 
“balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to 
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote 
national interests in preserving family integrity” through the provisions 
of the FMLA.30 
As of 2000, the FMLA covered 10.8% of private businesses in the 
United States and more than half of the country’s employees.31  In 
addition, 16.5% of all employees took leave in the eighteen months prior 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (2000). 
 27. Id. § 2601(a)(2). 
 28. Id. § 2601(a)(3), (a)(5). 
 29. Id. § 2601(a)(4). 
 30. Id. § 2601(b)(1).  Many stories show the extent to which the FMLA helps 
families.  For example, Patti Phillips was able to accompany her eighteen-year-old 
daughter through years of treatment for bone cancer, and was able to sit by her 
daughter’s bedside the day she was going to go to sleep for a little while but never 
awoke.  “You want to be there with your child, especially when it’s terminal, and you 
don’t want to worry about your job. . . .  The law gives you peace of mind,” she said.  
Stephanie Armour, Family, Medical Leave Act at Center of Hot Debate, USA TODAY, 
May 26, 2005, at B1.  A columnist also enjoyed the benefits of the Act and said that 
taking leave to care for his newborn son was: 
[T]he most rewarding month of my life. . . .  [M]y son had a healthier and 
happier start in life because of it. 
  . . . [E]very working parent should have the right to bond with a child 
when it counts most, when they need help with everything from feeding to 
learning how to grasp a pacifier. 
Daniel Vasquez, Parents, Let’s Fight to Preserve the Family Medical Leave Act, S. FLA. 
SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 2007, at 10A, available at 2007 WLNR 2710499. 
 31. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 19.  This is consistent with the fact that “far more 
employees work for large businesses than small ones.”  Mary E. Forsberg, Perspective 
on Family Leave, N.J. POL’Y PERSP., Jul. 2001, http://njpp.org/rpt_familyleave.html. 




to the 2000 DOL survey, as did a near equal percentage in 1995.32  The 
data shows that the FMLA has an expansive reach, and resolution of the 
waiver issue posed by varying interpretations of section 825.220(d) 
could potentially affect a majority of the employees in the country.  
Furthermore, if judicial enforcement of releases is contrary to the public 
interest, the aggregate effect on the public would be considerable given 
the large numbers of employees covered by the FMLA.33 
III.  THE CASE FOR ENFORCING FMLA SEVERANCE                          
AGREEMENT WAIVERS 
A.  Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc. and the Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation 
of the Plain Language of Section 825.220(d) 
In holding waivers enforceable, the Fifth Circuit was the first federal 
appellate court to assert a position on the FMLA severance agreement 
waiver issue.34  In Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., a former employee 
unsuccessfully challenged a post-termination release of claims under 
section 825.220(d).35  Faris, an occupational health specialist, had 
worked for a company for over a year and a half when her supervisor 
fired her, citing poor performance.36  That same day she was offered 
 32. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20. 
 33. While the FMLA covers eligible “employees,” like many antidiscrimination 
and labor statutes, it does not cover independent contractors.  This leaves a large portion 
of the workforce uncovered.  See Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to 
Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor 
Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 179–80 (2006).  Tarantolo notes that the lack of coverage 
of independent contractors in antidiscrimination statutes such as Title VII is particularly 
troubling because the contingent workforce is lower paid and therefore more at risk of 
falling into poverty if they lose their jobs.  Id. at 173–74.  It is also worrisome because 
contingent workers are more likely than traditional workers to be female and black or 
Hispanic, making them more likely to be targets of workplace discrimination.  Id. at 174.  
The prevalence of women might be explained by women choosing more flexible 
schedules to accommodate their family caretaking responsibilities, or because women 
have been segregated into the lower-skilled and lower-paying jobs of the contingent 
workforce.  Id. at 178.  Regardless of the reason, the fact that Congress enacted the 
FMLA after finding that family caretaking responsibilities often affect the lives of 
working women more so than those of men suggests that a definition of eligibility that 
includes independent contractors may be appropriate to serve the FMLA policy goals.  
For more on the “black hole” of regulatory protections for contingent workers, see 
Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting The Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 
(2003). 
 34. See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 35. Id. at 318.  As previously noted, section 825.220(d) states that “employees 
cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under [the] 
FMLA.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007). 
 36. Faris, 332 F.3d at 318. 
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$4,063.32 to sign a release of “all other claims arising under any other 
federal, state or local law or regulation.”37  She received a memorandum 
stating she had forty-five days to consider the release and seven days to 
revoke it if she signed.38  She signed the agreement and accepted the 
money, but later sued her former employer alleging that she was fired in 
retaliation for asserting her FMLA rights.39  Following discovery at trial, 
the defendants moved for summary judgment as to the enforceability of 
the release.40  Faris moved for partial summary judgment on whether the 
release was per se unenforceable under section 825.220(d).41  The 
district court denied the defendants’ motion and granted Faris’s, holding 
that the plain language of section 825.220(d) forbade waiving FMLA 
rights.42 
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendants argued that the plain 
language of section 825.220(d) did not apply to post-termination FMLA 
claims.43  They argued that the term employee in the regulation 
implicitly refers only to current employees, not to former ones, and also 
that the regulation applies only to substantive rights and not to causes of 
action.44  Alternatively, they argued that if section 825.220(d) is ambiguous, 
then “relevant law under similar statutory schemes” and the “common 
law presumption of and favor toward waivability” support a narrow 
reading of the regulation.45 
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendants that the proper reading 
was that the regulation does not apply to post-dispute claims for damages 
 37. Id.  This was the equivalent of one month’s salary. 
 38. However, demonstrating the possibility of coercion that will be discussed 
infra, Faris claimed she was pressured into signing the release when she was confronted 
by her supervisor and another employee and told, “This is your last opportunity to sign 
the release if you expect to get compensation for it.”  Id. at 318 & n.1. 
 39. Id. at 316, 318. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  The district court certified the questions of law addressed in its summary 
judgment order, and the Fifth Circuit granted the defendants leave to bring the 
interlocutory appeal.  Id. 
 43. Id. at 319. 
 44. Id. at 319–20. 
 45. Id. at 319.  The defendants also argued that the regulation was invalid under 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
The Fifth Circuit declined to consider this argument as it was not presented to nor passed 
on by the district court.  Faris, 332 F.3d at 319 n.2. 




under the FMLA.46  The court reasoned that the phrase “rights under 
FMLA” in section 825.220 only limited prospective waivers of 
substantive rights such as FMLA leave and reinstatement.47  The court 
did not believe that the phrase applied to the FMLA cause of action for 
prior violations.48  The court noted that the statute and regulation 
consistently use the phrase “rights under the FMLA” and “rights under 
the law” to refer to statutory rights of leave and reinstatement under 29 
U.S.C. § 2612 and 29 U.S.C. § 2614, respectively.49  It also explained 
that although the requirements constituting the cause of action in 
§ 2615(a) are detailed in section 825.220, the regulation never “refers to 
the cause of action for damages as a right under FMLA,” and the 
regulation itself is titled, “How are employees protected who request 
leave or otherwise assert FMLA rights?”50  Concluding that the text 
need be responsive to the title, the court found the plain language of 
section 825.220 to not ban FMLA prospective claims waivers.  In other 
words, the court asserted that the cause of action is merely a protection 
for FMLA rights.51  Despite this semantics-driven analysis, the court’s 
reasoning is weakened by its omission of the fact that section 825.220 
also addresses nonsubstantive provisions that give rise to causes of 
action.52  There are also probable shortcomings in the court’s suggestions 
 46. Faris, 332 F.3d at 319.  The court also found that the term employee within 
§ 825.220 does not unambiguously refer to former employees, and likely only extends to 
current employees.  Id. at 320.  The court noted that the term is used in various contexts 
in the statute to refer to only current employees, while in other situations it refers to 
former employees.  Id.  However, other courts have found the FMLA does apply to 
former employees.  See, e.g., Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-2336, 2006 
WL 2529632, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2006) (stating that the court “cannot fathom the 
Fifth Circuit’s narrow construction of § 825.220(d)”), vacated, 2007 WL 1165068, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).  The issue of whether or not the FMLA applies to former 
employees remains in dispute, partially due to the Act’s unhelpful definition.  The Act 
defines employee by referencing the FLSA definition: “the term ‘employee’ means any 
individual employed by an employer.”  29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2000).  In Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the United States Supreme Court described this 
definition, as applied under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as 
“completely circular and explain[ing] nothing.”  503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). 
 47. Faris, 332 F.3d at 320. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  For example, FMLA “rights” are associated with leave and reinstatement 
in section 825.220(b), which states that “‘[i]nterfering with’ the exercise of an 
employee’s rights would include, for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA 
leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) 
(2007). 
 50. Faris, 332 F.3d at 320–21. 
 51. Id. at 321.  The Secretary of Labor recently adopted this view of a “rights” and 
“claims” distinction in its brief arguing for rehearing of a Fourth Circuit decision which 
held waivers unenforceable.  See infra note 118. 
 52. See infra note 110 and accompanying text discussing 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 
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that public policy, freedom of contract, and the validity of ADEA and 
Title VII waivers also supported its position. 
B.  Public Policy and Market Principles 
In isolation, certain aspects of public policy and market principles may 
seem to support FMLA waivers.  The court in Faris, for example, claimed 
its holding was “bolstered by public policy favoring the enforcement of 
waivers,” though it did not elaborate on the assertion.53  The court was 
likely referencing the fact that public policy generally favors settlement 
of disputes without litigation, and allowing an employer and employee 
to resolve a FMLA claim through a private severance agreement serves 
this end in some circumstances.54  The court also presumably endorsed a 
freedom of contract approach to the analysis of waivers.  According to 
freedom of contract principles, courts should enforce private contracts 
between parties, including severance agreements and waivers, as they 
promote individual autonomy and the efficiency of labor markets.55  
However, applying strict freedom of contract principles may “destabilize 
personal, social, and community relationships and networks” because the 
approach focuses on individual preferences rather than societal needs.56  
A strict freedom of contract approach, therefore, may be contrary to 
public policy. 
1.  Freedom of Contract and Rational Choice 
Freedom of contract rests on the notion that an individual’s autonomy 
and preferences deserve recognition.57  This parallels the theory of 
 53. Faris, 332 F.3d at 321. 
 54. See, e.g., Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(stating that public policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without litigation). 
 55. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 
947, 951 (1984). 
 56. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 (1993) 
(noting that market economies actually “depend on significant degrees of inequality to 
give effective reign to individual incentives, . . . and thus may generate higher degrees of 
inequality” than other modes of social organization); see also Deborah Zalesne, 
Enforcing the Contract at All (Social) Costs: The Boundary Between Private Contract 
Law and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 579, 595–601 (2005) 
(discussing possible negative effects on third parties when contracts are enforced in the 
name of freedom of contract, and that various contract defenses such as unconscionability 
inadequately mitigate these effects). 
 57. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 56, at 19–21. 
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rational choice, in which individuals are viewed as rationally self-
interested and having “complete, transitive, and reasonably stable 
preferences.”58  They learn and compute the costs and benefits of 
various courses of action, seeking to maximize as many of their 
preferences as feasible.59  After considering their options, they are then 
presumed to choose the option that maximizes their subjecti 60
Viewing employers and employees as autonomous individuals capable 
of making rational choices in their best interests would seemingly 
support enforceable FMLA waivers.  For example, an employer may 
execute a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the time, expense, 
publicity, and unpredictability of litigating an employee’s claim of 
denial of adequate FMLA leave.  The results may lead the employer to 
conclude that it is in its best interest to “purchase” the employee’s 
release from liability for these prospective claims.  The cost of the waiver 
may be rationally justified even when the employer knows the employee 
is an “unlikely plaintiff,” given that the employer may know of or fear 
unrevealed inculpatory information, an office full of potential witnesses 
exists, and the employer enjoys future savings in not paying the 
employee’s benefits.61  For her part, the employee may well think it in 
her best interest to receive an immediate cash payment, rather than incur 
the time, expense, anxiety, and uncertainty of litigation.62  Freedom of 
contract suggests that courts should not interfere with the efficient 
market and should hold these parties accountable to their contract.  The 
limits of this argument may quickly be reached, though.  Whether the 
employee’s decision is actually rational depends on whether the employee 
has perfect information, as well as the abilities to process the information, 
calculate consequences, and recall the information, which she often does 
 58. Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudence of Law and Economics: Why More Economics 
Is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 773, 794 (1996); see also Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice 
and Rat Choice: Some Thoughts on the Relationship Among Rationality, Markets, and 
Human Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1091–92 (2005).  Rational choice theory 
argues that people use instrumental reasoning to achieve their pre-established ends.  The 
theory holds that individuals will choose the best means to achieve their ends, and so 
their choices are rational.  Id. 
 59. Ulen, supra note 58, at 794. 
 60. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 213 (1995).  See infra note 63 for limitations on employees’ 
abilities to make choices that achieve their best interests. 
 61. Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment 
Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 492–93 (2001).  
Employers are also “repeat players in these situations.  Through experience or 
counseling they have learned that lawsuits are expensive, emotionally draining, and 
time-consuming—whether or not the underlying complaint has merit.”  Id. at 492. 
 62. The employee’s choice is essentially “between guaranteed compensation and a 
contingent right to additional payment if she is able to prove [her claim].”  Id. at 492. 
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not.63  The argument also fails to consider situations where employees 
underestimate risks of the agreement due to ignorance of their FMLA 
rights.  Finally, employee waivers of their rights to pursue claims under 
the FMLA have an additional negative impact in that waivers remove 
the incentive for an employer to comply with the legal requirements of 
the FMLA.64  For these reasons, complete freedom of contract may not 
be well-suited to the employer-employee relationship.65 
2.  The Agreement Timing 
Waiver proponents can also argue that severance agreement waivers 
are not problematic because, at the time of severance, an employee’s 
focus is squarely on the realities of the agreement, which decreases the 
likelihood of an involuntary or unknowing waiver.66  A comparison of a 
 63. Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 214.  Eisenberg explains this concept, referred to 
as “bounded rationality,” and argues that actors often imperfectly process their options 
due to limited information, and to limited abilities to process information, calculate 
consequences, and utilize memory.  Id.  See infra text accompanying notes 155–56 for 
discussion of imperfect information as related to FMLA rights. 
 64. For example, consider an employee who makes a valid request to care for his 
ill wife.  The employer refuses and tells the employee he will be fired if he misses work.  
Months later the employee is fired for “poor performance,” and the employer offers him 
a severance agreement on the condition that he waive his right to pursue the denial of his 
leave request.  By this time, the employee faces mounting medical bills, and he is 
exhausted from working and caring for his wife over the past months.  He takes the 
money because he “could use it,” and he wants to focus on caring for his wife, although 
when his wife recovers he may wish he could pursue litigation instead.  The employer 
now realizes it has no absolute need to comply with the FMLA because it felt little 
impact from the recent violation.  In the future, the employer plans to comply with the 
Act for the most part, but recognizes that at some point its interests in productivity or 
other business desires may lead it to deny leave or reinstatement.  The employer will 
“purchase” a waiver at severance in those instances. 
 65. As Catherine L. Fisk puts it: “In short, contract law has never been a perfect fit 
for employment.”  Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and 
the Ownership of Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765, 769 (2002).  Fisk notes that the 
long-term and informal nature of the employment relationship is at odds with the 
traditional understanding of contract formation.  The unequal information between the 
parties and social norms “that make it difficult for employees to negotiate for the right to 
keep their job unless they really screw up or for employers to announce to prospective 
employees that they would like to be free to fire them arbitrarily” hamper negotiation.  
Id.  The risk of opportunistic behavior by both employees and employers is high, and 
“devastating social policy consequences occur when one party can exploit its superior 
market power at the expense of the other.”  Id. 
 66. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, 
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2003) (noting that when a 
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waiver at severance to one earlier in the employment stage illustrates 
this point.  Protectionist motives counsel against allowing employers to 
secure, at hiring, prospective waivers of liability for all FMLA violations 
the employer may commit in the future.  Waivers in this context ask 
employees to anticipate conflicts that have not occurred and to “evaluate 
workplace practices in light of technical, perhaps unknown, 
standards.”67  It would be nearly impossible for an employee to know at 
hiring if the employer is apt to violate FMLA provisions, or even if the 
employee will need to take advantage of its entitlements.  A new 
employee is also optimistic at hiring and is unlikely to forecast what 
would seem to be distant and abstract FMLA violations.  However, at 
severance the employee is more likely to focus her attention on the 
employer’s incentives, the gamut of possible claims she may have, the 
likelihood of proving her allegations, and the realistic consequences of a 
waiver.68  Additionally, at severance an employer likely can draft a more 
detailed agreement with more specific terms and provisions, thus 
reducing both the risks associated with an imperfect contract and reasons 
to be hesitant to 69
contract term is salient, the “market can be trusted to provide an efficient version of the 
term”). 
 67. Silverstein, supra note 61, at 487 (contrasting waivers conditioned on 
increased benefits, such as severance agreements, with settlement waivers made after 
legal action was instituted where employee has had adequate time to “identify and 
analyze the wrong done to her, assess the damage and calculate the money needed to 
speed recovery”). 
 68. An employee’s consideration of possible claims is relevant to the “totality of 
circumstances” test used by most federal circuits to determine whether a waiver of 
federal employment claims was “knowing and voluntary.”  See Craig Robert Senn, 
Knowing and Voluntary Waivers of Federal Employment Claims: Replacing the Totality 
of Circumstances Test with a “Waiver Certainty” Test, 58 FLA. L. REV. 305, 307–08 
(2006).  The factors dependent on the employee include: 
[T]he employee’s education, background, and business experience; whether 
the employee actually consulted with an attorney before signing the waiver; 
the role that an employee played in deciding the terms of the agreement; 
whether the employee actually knew or should have known of his or her 
employment rights at the time of signing the waiver; and whether the employee 
actually read and considered the waiver before signing it. 
Id. at 308. 
 69. The specificity of the agreement is also relevant to the totality of circumstances 
test discussed supra note 68.  The employer-controlled factors of the test include: “using 
clear, understandable waiver language; providing valuable consideration to the employee 
in exchange for the waiver; affording the employee adequate time in which to review and 
consider the waiver; and advising the employee to consult with an attorney prior to 
signing the waiver.”  Id.  For example, the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act 
(OWBPA) of 1990, an amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) of 1967, includes among the express requirements of an enforceable waiver of 
rights or claims under the Act that an agreement specifically refer to the rights or claims 
arising under the chapter, not waive rights or claims that may arise after the waiver is 
executed, and be written so that the individual and employer both understand it.  29 
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Although waiver proponents could thus argue that an agreement at 
severance ensures that employees have had sufficient time and information 
to assess the waiver benefits and risks, this reasoning generally fails to 
consider the effects on third parties.  For one, the goals of encouraging 
FMLA compliance are not adequately considered.  The reasoning also 
fails to take into account the impact of the waiver on remaining 
employees who may then be less willing to assert FMLA rights.70  
Therefore, even a knowing and voluntary waiver likely disserves the 
FMLA goals of providing leave time to promote the stability and 
economic security of families.71 
3.  Autonomy 
At first glance, autonomy and empowerment may also support 
waivers.  These characteristics are purportedly acquired when an 
individual evaluates the worth of her claim and prefers and chooses an 
immediate gain.  In analyzing waivers from an autonomy framework, 
Jessica Wilen Berg argues that waivers should be enforced when there is 
an overall gain of autonomy, taking into account the autonomy lost from 
giving up a right or claim.72  She submits that government interference is 
permissible only when individuals’ autonomous actions infringe on the 
autonomy of others, or when government rules will result in greater 
overall autonomy.73  In the FMLA context, there may be an overall gain 
U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2000).  For example, the Ninth Circuit held that an OWBPA release 
was not knowing and voluntary because it was not written in a “manner calculated” to be 
understood by parties where a provision stated that “[t]his covenant not to sue does not 
apply to actions based solely under [ADEA].”  Syverson v. IBM Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 
1083–87 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added by the court).  It was unclear whether ADEA 
claims were covered by the release or excepted from it.  Id. 
 70. See infra notes 76 and 131 and accompanying text. 
 71. Making rights less waivable, such as the “knowing and voluntary” requirements, 
may also be insufficient to protect even the individual employee.  According to Cynthia 
L. Estlund, “[T]hose who are skeptical of employees’ ability to protect their interests 
through contract find little comfort for employees—other than a modest gain in 
transparency—in rights that can be waived and default rules that fill contractual gaps, for 
employers often have little difficulty exacting waivers and filling gaps when it behooves 
them to do so.”  Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration 
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 379, 390 (2006). 
 72. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 289 & n.32 
(2003). 
 73. Berg, supra note 72, at 288–89.  For example, government regulations on 
maximum weekly work hours limit individual employees’ ability to “opt-out” of the 




of autonomy after the autonomous act of relinquishing rights.74  An 
employee who appraises a potential claim against her employer and 
thoughtfully decides to waive her rights to pursue it in exchange for 
compensation may well feel triumphant when she receives a check for 
payment.  Extracting money from her employer may make her feel 
significant in the eyes of her employer, as she did not let it “get away” 
with what she saw as an FMLA violation.75  From an employee’s 
perspective, the loss of autonomy in surrendering rights to pursue 
claims is potentially overcome by the reaped monetary and self-worth 
rewards, and the fact that whatever redress the employee envisioned as a 
remote possibility in the court system is already achieved.  However, the 
employee will feel less autonomous if she later learns that she 
undervalued a possible FMLA claim, or she learns after she signed a 
waiver that her FMLA rights were violated.  Government involvement is 
then justified if the autonomy of a majority of employees who individually 
agree to waivers is actually diminished, and illegalizing waivers would 
increase overall autonomy.  Furthermore, illegalizing waivers is possibly 
justified because the effect of an individual employee waiving rights to 
pursue FMLA claims likely extends beyond the “individual sphere” and 
infringes on other employees’ autonomy.76  This consequence occurs when 
coworkers are less willing to assert their own FMLA rights because they 
are unaware that an employee, whose rights they saw violated, received 
compensation as part of the waiver agreement. 
protections, but do so because an “across-the-board-rule” is the only way to protect the 
interests of all workers.  Id. at 298–99.  Individual exceptions are not permitted because 
they would either undermine the purpose of the rule, which would implicate others’ 
autonomy, or because power inequities prevent the employee from making a truly 
autonomous decision to waive the protections.  Id. at 299. 
 74. This argument assumes that the employee believes that the money received is 
payment for FMLA claims and not, for example, past wages or bonuses. 
 75. Autonomy is also an important aspect in other contractual contexts.  For 
example, premarital agreements serve the goal of increasing autonomy because 
“[a]llowing couples to make marital contracts encourages them to think realistically 
about the marriage, to anticipate and plan for contingencies, and to form relationships on 
their own terms.”  Rebecca Glass, Comment, Trading Up: Postnuptial Agreements, 
Fairness, and a Principled New Suitor for California, 92 CAL. L. REV. 215, 250 (2004).  
Concerns of infringement on individual autonomy also plague class action and mass tort 
class action lawsuits in which plaintiffs relinquish individual decisionmaking authority to 
bring an action as a class member.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put 
Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002). 
 76. Berg, supra note 72, at 289–90 (recognizing that state interference is justified 
to ensure that individuals have “freedom to act within the private realm” where one 
individual’s autonomous action has implications beyond the “individual sphere”). 
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Although public policy may favor settling disputes without litigation,77 it 
does not favor settlements or enforcing waivers at all costs.  Strictly 
following freedom of contract principles and enforcing waivers in the 
name of efficiency and individual autonomy likely creates more costs 
than gains to the public.  Permitting what may be a rational choice of 
one employee to waive violations of FMLA rights removes an incentive 
to the employer to abide by the Act, which is detrimental to other 
employees.78  In turn, the autonomy of other employees and their 
willingness to assert their FMLA rights is lowered by individual employee 
waivers.79  As this public policy argument for enforcing settlements 
ultimately fails as to FMLA waivers, so too do attempts to extend other 
policies to the FMLA. 
C.  ADEA and Title VII Expressly Allow Waiver of Claims 
Additional reasons suggested for allowing FMLA waivers have 
included that both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
and the civil rights protections under Title VII protect individuals from 
unlawful discrimination in employment, and each provide for potential 
claimants to waive their rights under the respective acts.80  It is 
important to note that these similarities “[are] not necessarily 
dispositive” of the waiver issue,81 and also that distinguishing features 
exist between these A
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer, employment agency, 
or labor organization to discriminate against an individual on the basis of 
age.82  The Act expressly allows “knowing and voluntary” waivers that 
 77. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  A severance agreement also differs 
from a settlement in that the employee may have no knowledge of a dispute when 
signing a severance agreement. 
 78. See infra note 131 and accompanying text, discussing the effect of waivers on 
remaining employees and the effect on employer FMLA compliance. 
 79. See supra note 76 and accompanying text, discussing how an employee’s 
waiver is apt to lower other employees’ autonomy and decrease their assertion of FMLA 
rights. 
 80. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c) 
(2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); see, 
e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the 
court’s allowance of FMLA waivers is supported by the existence of similar waivers in 
other regulatory contexts, including ADEA and Title VII). 
 81. Faris, 332 F.3d at 321. 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c). 




meet explicit statutory requirements.83  For an agreement to qualify as 
“knowing and voluntary,” it must be written in a manner calculated to be 
understood by the employee, and specifically refer to rights or claims 
arising under the ADEA.84  The employer must allow the employee at 
least forty-five days to consider signing the agreement, and provide that 
the agreement is revocable within seven days of signing.85  Employers 
must also advise employees to consult an attorney before making a 
decision.86 
Title VII, similarly, makes it unlawful for an employer to “refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”87  Public policy favors voluntary settlement of Title VII 
employment discrimination claims, so knowing and voluntary general 
releases of claims arising from discriminatory incidents that occurred 
during employment before execution of releases are typically valid.88  
Whether a Title VII release is knowing and voluntary is “not lightly to 
be inferred,” and presumably requires a degree of specificity in the 
waiver.89  Given the similarity in protections and interpretations of the 
FMLA, Title VII, and ADEA employment statutes, the court in Faris 
found “no good reason . . . why the government would proscribe waiver 
for FMLA retaliation claims and yet favor waiver of claims for age 
discrimination under ADEA and for civil rights violations under [T]itle 
VII.”90  However, “good reasons” to proscribe FMLA waivers may 
include that the FMLA has a unique purpose as compared with the other 
statutes and that some of its protections do differ, which the court did not 
examine. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which 
enforces the federal laws prohibiting job discrimination,91 also gave its 
approval to settling discrimination claims through post-dispute agreements 
 83. Id. § 626(f). 
 84. Id.  The agreement in Faris would not have met these requirements as the 
waiver did not specifically refer to FMLA rights.  See Faris, 332 F.3d at 318. 
 85. Faris, 332 F.3d at 318. 
 86. Id.  See infra note 240 for all requirements. 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 88. See, e.g., Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(enforcing prospective waiver where woman knowingly and voluntarily agreed to accept 
$800 in release of pursuing what she believed to be a valid discrimination claim). 
 89. Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1172 (5th Cir. 1976). 
 90. Faris, 332 F.3d at 322. 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4; see also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 
Federal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Laws, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeo/overview 
_laws.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).  The EEOC is not involved in the enforcement of 
the FMLA. 
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entered into knowingly and voluntarily.92  In a formal notice, the EEOC 
made clear that it appreciated employees’ rights and its role in vindicating 
the public interest in eradicating employment discrimination.93  The 
Commission emphasized that employers may not interfere with the 
protected rights of employees under Title VII, ADEA, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA),94 or the Equal Pay Act,95 as such interference 
is contrary to public policy and is guarded against in the anti-retaliation 
provisions of the statutes.96  The Commission also recognized that 
“individuals possess a non-waivable right to file charges with the EEOC.”97  
With this in mind, the EEOC then stated that it supported employer and 
employee efforts to voluntarily resolve employment disputes, and that 
“[n]othing in this enforcement guidance diminishes the Commission 
support for post-dispute agreements entered into knowingly and voluntarily 
to settle claims of discrimination . . . .”98  It is important to note, though, 
that the focus of the EEOC notice is on “post-dispute” agreements, 
which require that a dispute exist.  FMLA severance agreement waivers, 
on the other hand, are not limited to situations where a dispute has 
arisen.99 
Several arguments appear to support enforcement of FMLA waivers.  
First, the language of the Department of Labor regulation section 
825.220, referring to “rights,” and not “claims,” could be interpreted to 
permit waiving a specific cause of action.  Secondly, freedom of contract 
principles generally favor enforcement of private agreements.  Finally, 
the similarity between the FMLA and other antidiscrimination employment 
statutes which allow waivers ostensibly support judicial enforcement of 
 92. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915.002, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NON-WAIVABLE EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC) ENFORCED STATUTES § III(C) (Apr. 
10, 1997), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html [hereinafter EEOC NOTICE]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). 
 95. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). 
 96. EEOC NOTICE, supra note 92. 
 97. Id.  Employers, therefore, would be “shielded against” any further recovery by 
an employee where a valid waiver agreement or settlement exists.  Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. In other words, an FMLA waiver cannot be knowing and voluntary where no 
dispute has arisen because “[t]he only way an employee can know the facts and 
circumstances of the dispute, in order to make a knowing waiver, is after the dispute has 
arisen.”  Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-
Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 317 
(2003). 




employees’ prospective waivers of FMLA claims.  Despite these conceptions, 
however, strong countervailing interests and opposing arguments weigh 
against interpreting section 825.220(d) to allow waivers.  In fact, enforcing 
FMLA waivers may contravene public policy and may undermine the 
purposes of the Act by giving employers incentives to violate its 
provisions. 
IV.  THE FMLA ANTI-WAIVER APPROACH 
The FMLA anti-waiver approach would make illegal all severance 
agreement waivers of FMLA rights.  Some courts already emphatically 
refuse to recognize a FMLA severance agreement waiver as a valid 
contractual abrogation of rights to sue under the Act.100  Support for this 
approach is found in the language, regulations, and administrative 
history of the FMLA.101  This approach also serves congressional goals 
of achieving work and family life balance during times of need, while 
avoiding problems of employee coercion.  A discerning comparison of 
the FMLA to other antidiscrimination legislation also reveals that the 
similarities the statutes share do not compel enforcement of FMLA 
waivers. 
A.  Plain Language 
While the Faris court drew a distinction between “claims” and 
“rights” in section 825.220(d), other courts just as confidently assert that 
the phrase “[e]mployees cannot waive . . . their rights under [the] FMLA” 
does not implicitly allow claim waivers, because the terms claims and 
rights are interchangeable in this context.102  These courts view the right 
to seek redress for retaliation and discrimination as just as much a right 
 100. See, e.g., Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2005), 
aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 
(U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539); see also Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1056 
(8th Cir. 2006) (extending the Taylor rationale for invalidating prospective FMLA 
waivers to Title VII prospective waivers); Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., No. CV04-
1566-ST, 2006 WL 2045857, at *11 (D. Or. July 17, 2006); O’Brien v. Star Gas 
Propane, L.P., No. L-680-03, 2006 WL 2008716, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 
20, 2006). 
 101. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000) (including in text of FMLA no explicit 
allowance of waivers); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007) (stating that “[e]mployees cannot 
waive . . . their rights under [the] FMLA”); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 
60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995) (rejecting request to permit FMLA waivers in 
preamble to the FMLA implementing regulations). 
 102. See, e.g., Taylor, 415 F.3d at 375.  In Taylor, even the employer apparently did 
not distinguish between “claims” and “rights” in the “General Release and Severance 
Agreement” in which the employee purportedly signed away her rights under the FMLA. 
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under the FMLA as the right to leave and reinstatement.103  Furthermore, 
the definitions of waive and waiver apply as much to prospective 
contexts, such as the right to pursue a claim, as they do to substantive 
contexts, as in the leave and reinstatement provisions.104  This 
undermines the Faris court rationale, for which the term waiver would 
have to apply only to prospective uses and not retroactive uses for ripe 
claims.105 
While the court in Faris tried to decipher the meaning of the 
regulation through its own means, the United States Supreme Court has 
developed a test for judicial review of an agency’s construction of a 
statute rendered by the agency in charge of administering it, such as the 
DOL, for the FMLA.106  According to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., courts must first determine that 
Congress and the statute itself are silent on the particular question at 
issue, for if congressional intent is ascertainable, that intent governs and 
“is the law” despite any differing administrative construction.107  
Because no such intent can be gleaned from the FMLA statute itself, the 
question then becomes whether the agency’s construction is “based on a 
permissible construction” of the statute.108  The meaning of the DOL 
construction of the statute must first be established before attempting to 
answer this question. 
The court in Faris placed much emphasis on the word rights in the 
title of section 825.220, and relied on the tool of statutory construction 
 103. Id.  After all, the right to leave and reinstatement is of questionable value if 
there is not a commensurate right to seek redress for denial of those rights. 
 104. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1611 (8th ed. 2004) (defining waive as “[t]o 
abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, privilege, right, etc.); to give up (a right or 
claim) voluntarily”); see id. (defining waiver as “[t]he voluntary relinquishment or 
abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or advantage; FORFEITURE”).  
While not dispositive as to the meaning of section 825.220, the term waive is also often 
used in reference to post-dispute settlement of claims.  See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy 
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426–27 (1998) (discussing how the OWBPA limitations 
on “waivers” are applicable to ADEA releases of “claims”). 
 105. See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that “[a] plain reading of the regulation is that it prohibits prospective 
waiver of rights, not the post-dispute settlement of claims”). 
 106. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 107. Id. at n.9.  This Comment will not try to ascertain a specific congressional 
intent from Congress’s silence, because “‘inferences from congressional silence,’ in the 
context of administrative law, are often ‘treacherous.’”  EEOC v. Seafarers Int’l Union, 
394 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Castro v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 360 F.3d 721, 
729 (7th Cir. 2004); Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 108. See supra text at note 10; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 




that what lies below the title is necessarily limited by it.109  But the court 
failed to mention that a provision under this title, preceding the anti-
waiver provision, actually speaks to what the court deemed to be 
nonsubstantive rights: namely that employers may not discriminate or 
retaliate in employment actions such as hiring, firing, promoting, or 
disciplining employees who take leave.110  Thus, pursuing a claim for 
discrimination or retaliation is appropriately interpreted as covered by 
this title and is “otherwise assert[ing] FMLA rights.”111  It is then 
possible to view the regulation as limiting both substantive rights and 
proscriptive rights,112 with the anti-waiver provision applying to both.  
Such an interpretation belies the Faris court conclusion that the 
regulation does not pertain to or regulate waivers of proscriptive 
claims.113 
Even if courts conclude that the DOL regulation does not prohibit 
prospective waivers of FMLA claims, it does not follow that courts must 
endorse the construction.  According to the Supreme Court, the DOL 
construction cannot be maintained if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”114  At least one court has found that a 
DOL construction of the regulation that forbids waivers, or follows the 
anti-waiver approach, withstands the capriciousness test.115  The 
administrative history of the statute also sheds light on whether either 
construction is permissible. 
 109. Faris, 332 F.3d at 321 (noting that the title is: “How are employees protected 
who request leave or otherwise assert FMLA rights?” (emphasis added)); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.220 (2007). 
 110. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 2005), aff’d on 
reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 
22, 2007) (No. 07-539).  For example, the waiver ban would be viewed as extending to 
substantive rights to leave and reinstatement and proscriptive rights to not incur FMLA-
related discrimination or retaliation. 
 113. District courts have also addressed the claim versus right distinction with 
mixed results regarding whether contract provisions restricting the statute of limitations 
to bring FMLA claims are enforceable.  While some courts held the provisions 
unenforceable on the ground that section 825.220 bars interfering with employee “rights” 
under the FMLA, see, e.g., Henegar v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 280 F. Supp. 2d 680, 
682 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Lewis v. Harper Hosp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772–73 (E.D. 
Mich. 2002), other courts hold the opposite.  See, e.g., Badgett v. Fed. Express Corp., 
378 F. Supp. 2d 613, 625 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (finding that statutes of limitations exist to 
protect defendants and are not claimant “rights”). 
 114. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
 115. See, e.g., Taylor, 415 F.3d at 375. 
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B.  Administrative History of Section 825.220(d) and                        
Department of Labor Comments 
The preamble to the implementing FMLA regulations specifically 
addressed whether the Act envisioned valid severance agreement 
waivers of FMLA claims.  Prior to the implementation of the FMLA, the 
DOL invited public comments while it formulated rules for the 
legislation.116  Several large businesses and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce took exception to the “no waiver” provision, and recommended 
that the DOL adopt an explicit allowance of employee waivers in 
settlement or severance agreements.117  The DOL considered the proposal 
and proceeded to flatly reject it: 
The Department has given careful consideration to the comments received on 
this section and has concluded that prohibitions against employees waiving their 
rights and employers inducing employees to waive their rights constitute sound 
public policy under the FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards 
statutes such as the [Fair Labor Standards Act].118 
 116. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180 (Jan. 6, 1995) 
(preamble to the FMLA implementing regulations). 
 117. Id. at 2218.  Nationsbank Corporation, Southern Electric International, Inc., 
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recommended “explicit allowance of waivers and 
releases in connection with settlement of FMLA claims as part of a severance package.”  
Id. 
 118. Id.  In 2006, the DOL filed an amicus brief with the Fourth Circuit arguing for 
rehearing of the Taylor decision, which found FMLA waivers unenforceable.  See Brief 
for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee’s Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(No. 04-1525), available at  http://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/ taylor-08-16-2005.pdf 
[hereinafter DOL Brief].  The Secretary of Labor contended that despite the clarity of the 
implementing regulation statements, section 825.220 does not bar “retrospective 
settlement of FMLA claims.”  Id. at 4.  The Secretary urged the court to adopt the 
“rights” and “claims” distinction used by the Fifth Circuit.  Id.  The court later ordered 
the Secretary to submit a supplemental brief addressing whether this new interpretation 
was inconsistent with the initial DOL interpretation of the section.  See Supplemental 
Brief on Panel Rehearing for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Taylor v. 
Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525) [hereinafter DOL 
Supplemental Brief].  In its supplemental brief, the Secretary admitted that the preamble 
accompanying the final FMLA regulations was the only public explanation the DOL had 
issued on the FMLA waiver rule.  Id. at 2.  However, the Secretary claimed that its new 
interpretation was “consistent” with the past one, and was entitled to controlling 
deference despite the fact that it was first enunciated in a legal brief.  Id. at 5.  Even if the 
interpretations are consistent, the discussion in supra note 114 and accompanying text 
highlights that an agency’s interpretation need not be used if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  In a July 2007 ruling, the Fourth Circuit  affirmed 
and reinstated its prior opinion, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 




Such a straightforward rejection of any type of severance agreement 
waiver led a district court in Dougherty v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc. to refuse to enforce a secretary’s severance agreement waiver, given 
that “[a]ll parties appeared to acknowledge” that the regulation would 
bar “soon-to-be-former employees” from waiving rights to recover for 
FMLA violations that occurred during their employment.119  The 
explicitness of the DOL comments also led the district court to criticize 
the Fifth Circuit for what it described as a “tortuously limited definition” 
of the regulation in Faris.120 
In its comments in 1995, the DOL often compared the FMLA to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), including an illustration of why it 
concluded employees could not waive their FMLA rights.121  The FLSA, 
for its part, regulates the payment of overtime wages and requires 
employers to pay statutory minimum wages to employees engaged in 
commerce or the production of goods for commerce.122  FLSA claims 
for unpaid minimum wage or unpaid overtime can be settled or released 
only by the DOL or with court approval.123  As such, the Supreme Court 
consistently holds that FLSA rights cannot be “bargained away” or 
abrogated by contract as this would “nullify the purpose” of the 
statute.124  Given the DOL’s explicit intent for the FMLA to mirror the 
FLSA as to the validity of releases of damages or claims, a strong 
2005), once again holding that in the absence of DOL or court approval, section 825.220 
bars prospective and retrospective waivers of FMLA rights.  Taylor v. Progress Energy, 
Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007).  As this Comment was going to print, a petition for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed and awaits decision.  Progress Energy, Inc. v. 
Taylor, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539).  Additionally, in February 
2008, the DOL proposed to “clarify” the language in section 82.220(d), “in light of the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Taylor,” to provide that “employees and employers should 
be permitted to voluntarily agree to the settlement of past claims without having to first 
obtain the permission or approval of the [DOL] or a court,” denying that this would be a 
change in the law.  The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7876, 7897 
(Feb. 11, 2008).  Public comments to the proposed rule are due April 11, 2008.  Id. at 
7876. 
 119. No. 05-2336, 2006 WL 2529632, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006). 
 120. Id. 
 121. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2185–86, 
2218 (Jan. 6, 1995) (preamble to the FMLA implementing regulations). 
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2000).  The FLSA reflected a congressional purpose to 
protect “certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours 
which endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in 
interstate commerce.”  Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945) (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 2738, at 1, 13, 21, 28 (1938)). 
 123. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 371 
(4th Cir. 2005), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539). 
 124. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); D.A. 
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114 (1946); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. 
at 706–07. 
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argument exists that it is appropriate for courts to strike down any 
prospective waiver of FMLA claims as invalid and illegal. 
C.  The Public Interest is Harmed by the Enforcement                                     
of FMLA Waivers 
The notion of allowing individual employees to waive their FMLA 
rights for private economic gains is disconcerting, given that the broad 
public interest is clearly at the forefront of the Act, and “we all bear the 
cost” when employees are not granted leave.125  Individuals themselves 
were not the intended beneficiaries of the FMLA.126  The purpose of the 
FMLA was expressly to promote national interests in preserving family 
integrity and promoting the needs and stability of families.127  In 
addition, businesses that do not grant workers leave for family needs 
“fail to establish a working environment that can promote heightened 
productivity, lessened job turnover, and reduced absenteeism.”128  It is 
unlikely, then, that the Act is intended to endorse the monetary gain one 
former employee receives from a waiver where it fosters continued 
FMLA violations in that workplace.  It is equally unlikely that the 
government’s decreased ability to monitor the effectiveness of the Act, 
due to the bypassing of litigation through waivers, serves the public 
interest and the Act’s purposes. 
There is serious concern that allowing FMLA waivers would hurt the 
public interest by giving employers a “free pass,” or a slightly-more-
than-free pass, to discriminate.  An example of where the public interest 
has been undermined involves the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act 
 125. Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 24, at 51.  President Clinton noted that 
the cost falls upon everyone when employees are forced to choose between their jobs and 
personal and family obligations. 
When they must sacrifice their jobs, we all have to pay more for the essential 
but costly safety net.  When they ignore their own health needs or their family 
obligations in order to keep their jobs, we all have to pay more for social 
services and medical care as neglected problems worsen. 
Id.  An FMLA severance agreement waiver does not dispel these problems.  For 
instance, an employee whose medical problems worsened after her leave request was 
denied may resort to public assistance to pay her medical bills.  Had the employee taken 
leave, the condition may have been easily treatable and less expensive. 
 126. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000) (noting that the purpose of the FMLA is to balance 
the needs of families, promote national interests, and to promote the goal of equal 
employment for women and men). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 24, at 51. 




(OWBPA), a 1990 amendment to ADEA, under which employers who 
meet statutory requirements are permitted to secure releases from 
employees upon severance.129  The systematic problem is that the waiver 
will bar employees from bringing a suit which ripens when they later 
learn they were replaced by younger workers, leading one commentator 
to liken the waivers to a “license to discriminate.”130  While FMLA 
claims ripen during employment and so will not raise the same loophole 
concerns as OWBPA, a form of a license to discriminate is still available 
for purchase if waivers are enforced.  For example, consider the situation 
of an eligible employee who requests leave to care for an extremely ill 
parent.  If the employer knows that a waiver of FMLA rights will be 
enforced, the employer might refuse to honor the employee’s leave 
rights and instead plan to include a waiver of the violation in that 
employee’s future severance agreement.  In other words, the employer’s 
incentive is to deny FMLA rights to the extent it can afford to 
compensate the employee, and to the extent it believes the employee will 
agree to the waiver.  The employee stands a lesser chance that her 
FMLA rights will be recognized where the employer thinks its interests 
are better served through a waiver.  Over time, the distressed employee’s 
various absences from work for doctor and hospital visits may lead to 
her firing.  Regardless of whether or not she signs a waiver, her federal 
rights were violated and perceptions of FMLA rights in the workplace 
were lowered.131  Other employees’ knowledge of the denial of leave 
time will likely dissuade them from trying to assert their FMLA rights. 
The result of an enforceable waiver is that employers have less 
incentive to rein in their discriminatory practices as long as they commit 
acts valued at or below the cost they are willing to pay in a severance 
agreement.132  In this way, any unscrupulous employer can violate the 
FMLA to maintain or enhance its bottom line.  Employees working at 
large corporations which have funds available to purchase a waiver may 
 129. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000). 
 130. Richard J. Lussier, Title II of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act: A 
License for Age Discrimination? The Problem Identified and Proposed Solutions, 35 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 189, 194 (1998). 
 131. Even if a waiver is signed and the employee is compensated, other employees 
are unlikely to learn of this because the employee will no longer be working at the 
business or office.  It would be reasonable for remaining employees to believe that the 
violations went unremedied. 
 132. See Judith A. McMorrow, Retirement Incentives in the Twenty First Century: 
The Move Toward Employer Control of the ADEA, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 795 (1997), for a 
discussion of the waiver problem in an ADEA context: “Employers could put together 
incentives that otherwise would violate the ADEA, but offer attractive payments or 
buyouts under the shadow of layoffs.  Risk-adverse employees are likely to take the 
offer.  The employer’s underlying [unlawful] conduct is shielded from public review.”  
Id. at 807. 
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be particularly at risk of FMLA maltreatment.  In effect, the very fact 
that an employer is covered by the FMLA, meaning the business has 
fifty or more employees, may suggest that the employer is large enough 
to have sufficient funds to buy off an employee’s claims.133  Such 
disregard for FMLA protections, if sanctioned by enforceable waivers, 
would not serve the goals of deterrence for which employment statutes 
with antidiscriminatory provisions were passed.134 
There is also much to be said for the publicity and exposure entailed in 
litigation that private waivers preclude.  Compliance with the FMLA 
may be eroded by a lack of litigation because employers are shielded 
from “reputational effects” of their actions through private waivers.135  
Employers can “avoid[] potentially unfavorable publicity, thereby limiting 
consumers’, and others’, ability to know whether they are patronizing a 
lawbreaker.”136  Disclosures in litigation of employer discriminatory 
practices or workplace incidents are also themselves important, as they 
may reveal “patterns of noncompliance resulting from a misappreciation 
of the Act’s operation or entrenched resistance to its commands.”137  
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000). 
 134. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (stating 
that Title VII, FLSA, ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act were enacted to eliminate the 
“vestiges of discrimination” in employment practices, with objectives of deterrence and 
compensation for injuries). 
 135. Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, 
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 704 (2004) 
(examining the negative consequences of including mandatory arbitration clauses in 
individual employment contracts). 
 136. Id.  The recent class action suit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is an example of 
the negative publicity that can accompany allegations of discrimination in the 
employment context.  The plaintiffs, initially thought to include more than 1.6 million 
current and former female employees, allege that Wal-Mart frequently paid its female 
workers less than their male counterparts, and often bypassed women for promotions.  
Wal-Mart shares dropped ninety-seven cents, or 1.8%, in morning trading after the class 
action approval was announced in 2004.  Judge Certifies Wal-Mart Class Action Lawsuit, 
MSNBC, June 22, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5269131/.  Shares were little 
changed when the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s class certification in February 
of 2007.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), withdrawn, 509 F.3d 
1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (superseding withdrawn February 2007 opinion and again affirming 
lower court’s class certification).  The class could now include as many as 1.5 million 
women who have worked for Wal-Mart since 1998.  Dukes, 509 F.3d at 1174.  A likely 
effect of exposure and publicity of litigation was Wal-Mart’s hiring of a “chief diversity 
officer” and establishment of an advisory panel to develop “equal employment 
opportunity.”  Abigail Goldman, Wal-Mart Loses Job-Bias Appeal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
2007, at C3. 
 137. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358–59. 




This awareness of industry-wide misconceptions about FMLA policies 
or widespread refusal to follow its requirements may spur remedial 
government action, alert employees to their FMLA rights with which 
they are unfamiliar, and dissuade prospective employees from accepting 
employment at an egregious FMLA violator.  Bypassing litigation through 
the enforcement of private waivers, however, harms the government’s 
ability to measure the success of the FMLA as revealed in litigation 
disclosures of noncompliance.138  Finally, lack of litigation of FMLA 
claims may harm enforcement of the Act by inhibiting the development 
of precedent.139  This is detrimental because employment law precedent 
helps guide parties, illustrates how statutes are being interpreted, and 
builds a body of law that systematically elaborates the statute.140 
D.  Market-Based Approaches to the Law Are Ill-Equipped                             
to Further the Purposes of the FMLA 
Enforcing contracts on grounds of market efficiency and freedom of 
contract principles creates tension with outlying social relationships and 
can lead to institutions suffering as a result of individual maximizing 
behavior.141  This occurs because contract enforcement based on 
autonomy, voluntariness, and consent does not consider the needs of 
each person of a group and lacks sensitivity to surrounding individuals 
and communities.142  Reliance upon market-based approaches, which 
courts such as the one in Faris presumably used in support of enforcing 
the waiver in that case, can actually leave employment institutions and 
employees worse off and is contrary to why the FMLA was created. 
1.  Lack of Employee Bargaining Power 
The primary method for asserting employee needs in the United States 
has traditionally been through market-based approaches and freedom of 
contract.143  Although market-based approaches rely on the efficacy of 
individual bargaining, employees have notoriously small bargaining 
 138. See id. at 359 (noting that the efficacy of an Act’s enforcement mechanisms, as 
revealed in litigation disclosures of noncompliance, is important in measuring the 
success of the Act); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) 
(“[T]he private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the 
important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices.”). 
 139. See Summers, supra note 135. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Zalesne, supra note 56, at 595–96. 
 142. TREBILCOCK,  supra note 56, at 18. 
 143. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen Brun, Protecting Families in a Global 
Economy, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 188–89 (2006). 
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er that led to the enacting of the 
FMLA. 
restricted.149  However, market failures do occur and lead institutions to 
 
power, leading them to acquire only “uneven benefits” and an “impoverished 
solution” which may fail to meet their basic needs.144  For example, 
prior to the FMLA, a father-employee who missed work to care for a 
gravely sick daughter could be fired by his employer and left 
unemployed with no recourse or remedy under federal law.  Private 
negotiations and contract, which produced such unpalatable results for 
employees, have been eroded by government involvement through 
legislation such as the FMLA.145  Given that a lack of bargaining power 
makes it nearly impossible for employees themselves to secure 
allowances for family and medical leave from employers, Congress 
intervened through legislation to protect a majority of the U.S. 
workforce.146  Allowing employees to bargain with employers over 
terms of a severance agreement waiver would present the same concerns 
of unequal employee bargaining pow
2.  Market Failure and Imperfect Information 
Even if viewed from an economic perspective, embracing the anti-
waiver approach may not violate market principles that value freedom of 
contract.  A market-based approach suggests that market forces will 
ensure that contracts, including FMLA waivers, are socially efficient and 
beneficial.147  This is premised on the idea that a perfect market itself 
corrects any “market failure,” or anything that prevents it from operating 
perfectly.148  For this reason, the freedom of contract should not be 
 144. Id. at 188; see also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 
735 (1981) (noting that national labor and employment policies are “[p]redicated on the 
assumption that individual workers have little, if any bargaining power”). 
 145. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting the Demands of Workers into the Twenty-
First Century: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 686–87 
(1993). 
 146. Id. at 687.  A similar lack of bargaining power and need for at least minimal 
employee protection also led Congress to enact workers compensation, unemployment, 
and wage and hour legislation.  See Marc D. Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of 
Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 73–74 (1985). 
 147. Korobkin, supra note 66, at 1203. 
 148. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 81, 84 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). 
 149. Id.; see also Korobkin, supra note 66, at 1207 (noting that, in reference to 
buyers and sellers, “[w]ithout market failure, there is no valid consequentialist argument 
for non-enforcement of any contract terms”). 




intervene.150  In the FMLA context, a market failure plausibly occurred 
by way of the lack of employee bargaining power with employers which 
prevented employees from obtaining protection for their basic needs 
through contract.151  Congress’s intervention in 1993 through the FMLA 
could be viewed as the corresponding institutional involvement.  From 
this perspective, a pre-FMLA market failure arguably occurred and 
corrective legislative measures were justifiably taken.  Therefore, courts 
restricting the freedom of contract by holding waivers illegal are acting 
in accordance with market principles because they are upholding the 
corrective measure that remedied the market failure. 
Imperfect information can also cause market failure.152  This imperfection 
can take the form of a person misperceiving changes in the risks in a 
contract.153  In the situation of an employee presented with a severance 
package and waiver, the employee is particularly likely to misperceive 
the allocation of risk as to FMLA claims.  Data from the DOL raise 
concerns about the extent of employees’ knowledge of their rights under 
the Act, and subsequently knowledge of claims they may be waiving.154  
The DOL survey in 2000 showed “a majority of employees in both 
covered and noncovered establishments have heard of [the] FMLA, but 
about half do not know whether the law applies to them.”155  The fact 
that such large numbers of employees are unsure if they are even 
covered by the FMLA, let alone do not know the specifics of the 
legislation, would seem to constitute imperfect information for purposes 
of a market failure that necessitates government intervention.  Employees 
who are unfamiliar with the substance of the FMLA and its possible 
application to them cannot know that they are signing away rights to 
pursue FMLA claims they do not know exist.  That discrimination 
against working mothers in the workplace is often subtle and difficult to 
detect may also lead women employees to not recognize a claim they 
 150. Craswell, supra note 148. “Market failure” is anything that prevents the market 
from operating perfectly.  Id. at 84. 
 151. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
139, 213–14 (2005) (discussing that a market failure may occur when parties with 
disparate status-based characteristics, such as poverty or wealth, or lack of education or 
business sophistication, attempt to transact). 
 152. Craswell, supra note 148, at 84. 
 153. Id. at 89. 
 154. See Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20. 
 155. Id.; see, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 628 (2001) (stating that 
employee testified he was unfamiliar with the FMLA because employer Maryland State 
Police Department provided no notice to employees of FMLA provisions, and employer 
told him there was “no way” he could take more than two weeks of leave to care for 
newborn and his wife). 
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may have.156  In all, employees are likely to erroneously evaluate the 
risks in the severance package, leading them to believe they are walking 
away with a much more favorable bargain than actually exists.  While a 
court that enforces FMLA waivers would presumably require that they 
are “knowing and voluntary,”157 a presumption that they are binding 
would lead to many signed and privately executed agreements that never 
received a court’s scrutiny, resulting in the employees’ ignorance of 
their rights going undetected.158 
Finally, if the market is functioning imperfectly and necessitates 
government involvement, the market is improved only if a court or 
legislature can “ban the inefficient terms without also banning the efficient 
ones.”159  In the FMLA context, the analysis might more appropriately 
 156. The subtle nature that employment discrimination against women may take is 
due in part to mutually reinforcing stereotypes against women in the workplace.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist noted in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs that 
“[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes 
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.”  538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).  
Presuming a lack of domesticity in men led employers, prior to the FMLA, to deny men 
leave accommodations because the family was regarded as the “woman’s domain.”  
These stereotypes led women to continue to assume the role of primary caregivers, and 
“fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their 
value as employees.”  Id.  Such engrained perceptions of gender roles in the workplace 
create an environment where subtle discrimination may be difficult to detect.  Id.  See 
infra notes 209, 210, and accompanying text for more of the Supreme Court’s discussion 
of gender discrimination in Hibbs. 
 157. Federal employment statutes in which waivers are enforceable generally 
require that they be “knowing and voluntary.”  See Senn, supra note 68, at 309 
(recognizing that nine of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals use a totality of the 
circumstances test to assess knowledge and voluntariness, while the Fourth and Eighth 
Circuits continue to use a contract-based approach); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) 
(2000) (requiring knowing and voluntary waivers for ADEA). 
 158. Despite the troubling statistics showing a fairly uninformed workforce, the 
2000 data also show an increased use of leave for reasons other than one’s own health.  
Waiver proponents could argue that this increase reflects a growing awareness of the 
types of leave afforded under the FMLA, and subsequently greater knowledge of the 
Act’s protections.  See Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20. 
 159. Craswell, supra note 148, at 89.  The question is unsettled as to what notice of 
FMLA provisions an employer must provide.  The statute provides that an employer 
must post a notice “in conspicuous places” setting forth employees’ FMLA rights.  29 
U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000).  However, the DOL expanded upon this requirement and issued 
regulations requiring “more comprehensive and individualized notice” for those 
employees who request leave.  Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 
81, 87–88 (2002) (“According to the Secretary . . . the regulations [are] necessary to 
ensure that employees are aware of their rights when they take leave.”).  The Supreme 
Court passed on the question of whether the regulations accord with the statute and are 
valid.  Id. at 88.  The DOL noted the Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc. decision 




look to ensuring that Congress’s introduction of efficient terms is not 
counteracted.  In other words, if misinformation or lack of bargaining 
power creates a form of market failure justifying some degree of 
institutional aid in specifying employment terms, this intervention is 
counteracted by employee waivers of those terms.  While Congress may 
have introduced large-scale family and leave protections, including 
terms of leave,160 reinstatement,161 and anti-retaliatory provisions,162 so 
long as courts are free to enforce waivers of claims to these rights, the 
inefficiency sought to be expunged returns.  Allowing waivers would not 
forestall the market from operating with misperceptions, misinformation, 
and unequal bargaining power; thus the waivers would constitute 
inefficient terms that should be banned.  If the term is not barred, then 
employees are left with the same unprotected status that they had prior to 
the FMLA protections. 
E.  Concerns of Employer Coercion: Economic                                        
Duress and Undue Influence 
The frequent financial vulnerability and worries of FMLA leave-
takers raise concerns that coercive economic undertones may be present 
when employees waive their rights.  The most frequent concern of FMLA 
leave-takers in the 2000 DOL survey was financial.163  More than fifty-
three percent of them “worried about not having enough money to pay 
the bills” and some cut their leave short due to money issues.164  Of 
those who did not take leave, seventy-seven percent said it was because 
they could not afford it.165  Additionally, more than two-thirds of leave-
takers aged eighteen to twenty-four who had household incomes below 
$20,000 did not receive pay during their leave, and less than one-fourth 
of older leave takers, aged fifty to sixty-four, with household incomes of 
$50,000 or more received no pay.166  In all, over fifty-eight percent of 
and solicited public comment on the notice issue in its recent request for public comment 
regarding FMLA effectiveness.  Request for Information on the Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg, 69,504, 69,508 (Dec. 1, 2006).  See supra note 17 for 
further discussion of the DOL request.  For more on FMLA notice requirements, see 
Debra L. Greenberger, Note, Toward Increased Notice of FMLA and ADA Protections, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1797 (2005) (arguing that the FMLA notice regime needs to be “re-
conceptualiz[ed]” to focus on reaching target populations, and to compensate for 
employees’ hesitancy to assert their statutory rights). 
 160. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000). 
 161. Id. § 2614(a)(1). 
 162. Id. §§ 2614(a)(2), 2615(a). 
 163. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 21. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
SNORGRASS POST-AUTHOR PAGES 4.3.08.DOC 4/22/2008  1:32:05 PM 
[VOL. 45:  163, 2008]  Family and Medical Leave Act 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 195 
 
leave-takers not receiving pay characterized it as “somewhat or very 
difficult to make ends meet.”167  In light of the financial hardship facing 
many covered employees, it would be unsurprising if employers 
recognized the vulnerability of the workers and used it to their advantage 
to persuade employees to sign severance package waivers of rights to 
pursue damages for FMLA violations.168 
Courts will police severance agreements and contracts for hints of 
undue influence or economic duress as a “‘last resort’ to correct 
exploitation of business exigencies.”169  Economic duress renders a 
contract voidable, while undue influence will render it invalid and 
unenforceable.170  Whether the pressures on an employee to sign a 
 167. Id. 
 168. The employer may also be able to take advantage of related employee 
concerns.  As Eileen Silverstein discusses, even if an employee with a possible 
employment discrimination claim is “quite angry and ‘knows in her bones’ that her 
employer acted illegally . . . she recognizes the need to secure another job and the 
unattractiveness of an applicant who is suing a former employer.”  See Silverstein, supra 
note 61, at 492.  The illegalization of FMLA waivers in the anti-waiver approach would 
not dispel this employee’s concerns as to the effect of pending litigation against her 
former employer.  However, the anti-waiver approach would help preclude the 
discrimination from occurring in the first place.  If the employer knows it cannot buy a 
release, the employer then has incentives to comply with the FMLA and avoid the 
expense, publicity, and uncertainty of litigation.  See text at notes 132 through 136 for 
discussion of deterrence and publicity.  The anti-waiver approach precludes the employer 
from capitalizing on employee fears of having to obtain new employment by ensuring 
court or DOL action to hold the employer accountable for its noncompliance with the 
FMLA. 
 169. Johnson v. IBM Corp., 891 F. Supp. 522, 529 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Rich 
& Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1994)) (upholding 
release of claims as it was not obtained through economic duress or undue influence); 
see also Aubert v. Entergy Corp., 762 So.2d 288, 291–92 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (reviewing 
and upholding OWBPA releases against economic duress challenge where employees 
discovered possible age-motivation in their low performance rankings which led them to 
agree to the releases).  In Faris, for example, the employee alleged duress, stating that 
she was pressured into signing the agreement because she was confronted by her 
supervisor and told, “This is your last opportunity to sign the release if you expect to get 
compensation for it.”  Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2003).  
The court found that she did not tender back the consideration to ratify the release.  Id. at 
322–23. 
 170. For undue influence to void an agreement, courts must generally find that 
persuasion is exercised on a party who is under the domination of the person executing 
it, and that person is justified in assuming the other will not act in a manner inconsistent 
with their welfare.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1981).  A release may 
be rendered voidable due to economic duress where a party is subjected to a wrongful act 
such as an improper threat, and must succumb to the party or face “financial ruin.”  
Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001).  The wrongful act must be 
sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonable person faced with no reasonable alternative to 




presumably enforceable waiver rise to a level to make the waiver voidable 
is not examined unless the employee later decides to challenge the 
agreement in court.  Thus, employers may take advantage of employees’ 
unequal bargaining power and financial instability to induce the employees 
to waive FMLA rights on the hope that the employee will not undertake 
to challenge the agreement.171  Making FMLA waivers illegal removes 
this incentive of the employer to exploit employees. 
F.  Courts Should Not Treat the FMLA Analogously                                        
to ADEA and Title VII 
1.  The FMLA Distinguished 
Courts that have held waivers enforceable have often done so on 
grounds that the FMLA is similar to ADEA and Title VII in that all three 
are employment antidiscrimination statutes with similar protections, and 
waivers are enforceable under ADEA and Title VII.172  However, this 
argument overlooks an overriding distinction that separates the FMLA 
from the other statutes: the FMLA is directed toward protecting families, 
not merely individuals as employees.173 
Unlike ADEA and Title VII which were enacted to protect individual 
employees from discrimination,174 the FMLA addresses itself to the 
larger sphere of the family.175  For their part, Title VII protects 
“individuals” from employment practices that discriminate on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,176 and ADEA protects an 
succumb to the pressure.  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 
(1981) (defining economic duress as an improper threat made, which includes a threat 
where resulting agreement is on unfair terms and either what is threatened is otherwise a 
use of power for illegitimate ends, or the threat’s effectiveness in inducing assent is 
significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making the threat).  Economic 
duress will not be found simply because an employee entered into an agreement with 
which they were not fully satisfied.  Bhushan v. Loma Alta Towers Owner’s Ass’n., 148 
Fed. App’x 882, 886 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 171. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, for example, discussion of Title VII and ADEA and the reasoning of the 
Fifth Circuit in Faris, supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 173. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000) (stating purposes of FMLA include “to 
balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability 
and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family 
integrity”). 
 174. The purposes of ADEA include to “promote employment for older persons 
based on their ability rather than age” and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination and 
help employment.  29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000).  The purpose of Title VII is to make 
unlawful employment discrimination against an individual on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 175. See supra notes 4, 126, and accompanying text. 
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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“individual” from discrimination in employment on the basis of age.177  
To be sure, these two Acts are strikingly similar.  The Supreme Court 
has noted that prohibitions in ADEA were derived verbatim from Title 
VII.178  On the other hand, Congress explicitly stated that the purpose of 
the FMLA was to strike a balance between the demands of the 
workplace and the needs of families, to promote the stability and 
economic security of families, and to preserve family integrity.179  
Analyzing these three statutes as if they are one and the same ignores the 
fact that Congress intended the FMLA to protect the interests of more 
than just the employee who is given an option by her employer to release 
statutory violations; the Act envisions broader protections.180  The 
broader protection is evidenced in that even “stray but hostile remarks” 
are actionable under the FMLA because they may inhibit employees 
from taking leave or “utiliz[ing] other family-friendly benefits.”181  Title 
VII, on the other hand, focuses on “overt subjective intent” and more 
than offhand remarks are required to constitute discrimination.182 
It is true that in some situations families would benefit from a family 
member receiving money in lieu of the right to pursue FMLA claims, 
such as when the family is facing pressing economic difficulties.  But 
this does not support waivers generally.  For one, the economic pressure 
the family member-employee feels increases the likelihood that the 
employee can be taken advantage of by the employer who offers 
undercompensation for the waiver.  Families will be harmed if the 
family member accepts a small payout where a much larger award was 
 177. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000). 
 178. Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 & n.12 (1978) (comparing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and noting that Title VII and ADEA 
provisions each make it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
an individual,” or to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”). 
 179. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000). 
 180. Martin H. Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave Under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 329, 365–69 (2003) (discussing in what 
ways the FMLA provides broader protection than Title VII and “its progeny”).  Not only 
does it envision broader protections, but Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs that the FMLA was enacted after Title VII 
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act both failed to rectify the gender discrimination 
problem in parental leave.  538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003).  It is therefore unlikely that 
Congress intended FMLA provisions to mirror Title VII, as Title VII itself was an 
unsuccessful legislative attempt to eradicate the discrimination. 
 181. Malin, supra note 180, at 367. 
 182. Id. 




available if the claim was recognized or pursued.  In other words, a 
waiver for a small amount of cash may eliminate a claim worth many 
times more money, to the family’s detriment.  Given the problems of 
unequal bargaining power and coercion of employees, protecting the 
interests of families supports forbidding family members from waiving 
their rights, especially when they are most vulnerable.183 
Because ADEA and Title VII were enacted with more of a focus on 
the individual than was the FMLA, it is reasonable that the individual is 
permitted to waive claims and rights under those two acts.  The statutes 
contemplate protecting society through protection of the individual, not 
protecting society family by family.184  Conversely, the FMLA seeks to 
secure and protect the needs of children, spouses, and parents in the 
family unit.185  Because Congress sought to protect multiple persons’ 
interests in one context, it is doubtful it intended for an individual to 
singlehandedly waive violations that affected the interests of multiple 
family members.  For example, the 2000 DOL survey showed that a 
large majority of leave-takers said that taking leave had a positive 
impact on their ability to care for family members (78.7%), their own 
family’s emotional well-being (70.1%), and their own family member’s 
physical health (63.0%).186  Enforcing a waiver of claims which may 
have arisen after detrimentally impacting an entire family unit is at odds 
with the FMLA, an Act through which Congress intended to protect 
more than just the employee.187 
Other distinctions between employment discrimination statutes counsel 
against analyzing the statutes as one and the same.  For one, Title VII 
and the ADA pertain to individuals in their capacity as employees.188  
The FMLA, as previously noted, extends beyond the workplace and is 
intended to preserve the family and work-life balance.189  Title VII also 
applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, while the FMLA 
 183. The Fourth Circuit in Taylor noted the vulnerability of FMLA employees in 
stating that the FMLA leave standard is necessary so that the “‘minority of employers 
who act irresponsibly [unscrupulous employers]’” cannot “more easily exploit 
employees at the times when they are most vulnerable.”  Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 
415 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in 
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7), aff’d on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. 
filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539). 
 184. Nowhere in ADEA or Title VII do the statutes include provisions regarding 
family or family members.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). 
 185. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000). 
 186. Waldfogel, supra note 4, at 20. 
 187. Unlawfully denying a leave request likely harms the person for whom the 
employee sought to care.  For example, a severely ill parent loses the companionship, 
comfort, and physical care that an adult child can render by way of taking leave. 
 188. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). 
 189. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000). 
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minimum is fifty employees.190  Because smaller employers tend to be 
on fairly even bargaining terms with employees,191 it is more reasonable 
that Title VII allows for waivers.  The fact that FMLA-covered employers 
may be larger alludes to their ability to entertain litigation in the court 
system, whereas the burden of the expense of litigation on a Title VII or 
ADA employer weighs in favor of allowing waivers.192  The FMLA also 
applies to all state and local government employers regardless of the 
employer’s size.193  The size of the government employer may not 
matter as much as that of a private employer because in all government-
employer disputes the cost of defending from liability lies with the 
government.  Finally, waivers are enforceable under Title VII because 
Congress’s preferred method—or method that is “at least as viable as 
any other”—to vindicate those rights is through “voluntary conciliation 
and compliance.”194 
2. The FMLA May Be Better Characterized as a Labor, Rather                  
than an Antidiscrimination, Statute, Which Weighs                                   
Against the Enforceability of Waivers 
Despite some judicial analysis of the FMLA as comparable to the 
ADA, Title VII, or ADEA,195 the statute may best be described as one 
regulating labor practices like the FLSA, rather than discriminatory 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (2007). 
 191. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using 
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 465–66 (2000) 
(discussing also that smaller start-up businesses not covered by the FMLA are often 
more vulnerable to employment discrimination lawsuits because they do not have the 
“proper mechanisms to ensure that hiring and firing isn’t discriminatory” (quoting 
Tatiana Boncompagni, High-Tech: Full Employment Act—Labor Practices Boom with 
Economy, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 1)). 
 192. See, e.g., Melissa S. Wandersee, The Far-Reaching Effects of Reproduction as 
a “Major Life Activity” Under the ADA: What Will This Expansion Mean to Employers 
and Their Insured?, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 429, 433 (1999) (noting that for 
ADA, small business owners will likely agree to “the most extreme requests for 
accommodation [so to comply with the “reasonable accommodations” requirement of the 
statute] because they cannot afford to risk litigation”).  It is likely that smaller employers 
such as these are more able to afford to buy a release of liability from an employee rather 
than endure costly litigation expenses. 
 193. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104(a), 825.108. 
 194. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 862 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
 195. See, e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(comparing the FMLA to ADEA and Title VII). 




ones.196  While waivers are generally enforceable under the antidiscrimination 
statutes,197 they are not enforceable under labor statutes such as the 
FLSA.198 
It bears repeating that the Department of Labor explicitly analogized 
the FMLA to the FLSA when issuing the regulations that would govern 
the FMLA.199  In considering the FMLA, the House of Representatives 
also analogized it to minimum standards of child labor laws, the 
minimum wage, and health and safety standards,200 while the Senate said 
the “minimum labor standard” was necessary for healthy competition.201  
Congressional debate also reveals that the Act was envisioned to be a 
labor-oriented statute rather than one aimed as much at combating 
discrimination, as were Title VII and ADEA.202  Furthermore, the 
 196. See Michael L. Ripple, Comment, Supervisors Beware: The Family and 
Medical Leave Act May be Hazardous to Your Health, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. & 
POL’Y 273, 276 (1999). 
 197. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000) (allowing knowing and voluntary waivers under 
ADEA); Rogers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1986) (enforcing Title 
VII waiver); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (including no prohibition on waivers in 
Title VII text). 
 198. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–08 (1945).  The Court noted 
that the FLSA was enacted to 
protect certain groups of the population from sub-standard wages and 
excessive work hours which endangered the national health and well-being and 
the free flow of goods in interstate commerce.  The statute was a recognition of 
the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power as between employer and 
employee, certain segments of the population required federal compulsory 
legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national 
health and efficiency . . . .  No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of 
statutory wages [or employee’s right to liquidated damages] by agreement 
would nullify the purposes of the Act. 
Id. at 706–07; see also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 
(1981) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the FLSA frequently 
emphasize the nonwaivable nature of employee’s right to minimum wage and overtime 
pay under the FLSA, and stating that “FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or 
otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute and thwart the 
legislative policies it was designed to effectuate” (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. 
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945))); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114–16 
(1946) (stating that “the remedy of liquidated damages cannot be bargained away by 
bona fide settlements of disputes of coverage” because allowing waivers of liquidated 
damages would thwart public policy of promptly paid, mandatory minimum wages that 
Congress adopted in the FLSA). 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
 200. H.R. REP. NO. 103-8(II), at 37 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6–7. 
 201. S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 5, 18 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7, 20 
(“Federal labor standards take broad societal concerns out of the competitive process so 
that conscientious employers are not forced to compete with unscrupulous employers. . . .  
Uniform standards like the FMLA help all businesses maintain a minimum floor of 
protection for their employees without jeopardizing or decreasing their competitiveness.”). 
 202. Senator Dodd referred to the legislation as a “minimum labor standard, 
recognizing the demographic changes that have occurred in this country and the absolute 
necessity not to place working families in the position where they must choose between 
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penalties imposed by the FMLA also resemble labor statutes in that they 
are more expansive than traditional employment antidiscrimination 
statute penalties.203  The FMLA allows for equitable and punitive relief 
against “any employer,” which has been interpreted to apply to both 
employers and individuals themselves, such as supervisors.204  Individual 
liability under antidiscrimination statutes, on the other hand, has been 
rejected by courts.205  Finally, that Congress chose to protect smaller 
businesses from obligations to provide FMLA protections when it 
created a fifty-employee minimum shows that Congress was conscious 
of the economic consequences of the Act and not squarely focused on 
protection from discrimination as in other statutes.206  Because the FLSA 
does not permit generic employee waivers, viewing the FMLA as a 
similar labor statute supports illegalizing employee severance agreement 
FMLA waivers, or at least supports requiring some fairness scrutiny of 
the agreement.207  Even viewing the FMLA in part as a labor statute 
distinguishes it from the civil rights statutes which are focused primarily 
on eradicating discrimination. 
G.  Women in the Workplace 
Forbidding FMLA waivers may also be important to achieve the 
FMLA objectives as related to women in the workplace.  Congressional 
FMLA findings indicated that the nature of the roles of men and women 
in society often leads the primary responsibility of family caretaking to 
fall on women, thus affecting the lives of working women more than 
the family that they want to take care of during a time of crisis and the job they need.”  
These comments on the Senate floor allude to the likelihood that the legislation was 
more a labor statute taking into account changes in U.S. society than a full-fledged 
antidiscrimination statute.  139 CONG. REC. S1254, S1257 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) 
(statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 203. Ripple, supra note 196, at 299. 
 204. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2000); Ripple, supra note 196, at 299. 
 205. Ripple, supra note 196, at 299; see, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 
Ltd., 55 F.3d, 1276, 1279–81 (7th Cir. 1995) (deciding that ADA definition of employer, 
which mirrors the definition in Title VII and ADEA, does not extend to individual 
liability). 
 206. See Ripple, supra note 196, at 300–01.  This Congressional intent to minimize 
the economic consequences of the FMLA has proven successful, as both the 1995 and 
2000 DOL surveys revealed that about ninety percent of employers found no noticeable 
effect on their business as a result of complying with the FMLA.  Waldfogel, supra note 
4, at 19. 
 207. See infra note 225, discussing how FLSA waivers are enforceable only after 
judicial approval or the Secretary of Labor approves the agreement. 




those of men.208  In upholding the FMLA and its abrogation of state 
immunity in 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the record of 
states’ unconstitutional participation in and fostering of gender-based 
discrimination in administering leave benefits justified the prophylactic 
legislation.209  He noted Congress’s finding that “[h]istorically, denial or 
curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been traceable 
directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and 
workers second,” which in turn has “justified discrimination against 
women when they are mothers or mothers-to-be.”210  The pervasive 
history of gender discrimination against mothers in the workplace raises 
concerns that women may be particularly susceptible to coercion in 
agreeing to sign FMLA waivers, or may be targeted by employers to 
sign such agreements.  To allow waivers might insulate employers from 
liability for such discrimination and, contrary to the FMLA, actually 
promote it.211 
V.  INVALIDATING AND ILLEGALIZING FMLA WAIVERS 
Although there are arguments for enforcing FMLA waivers, resting 
primarily on freedom of contract principles that purport to promote an 
efficient market,212 stronger countervailing arguments require prohibiting 
them.213  The FMLA was not enacted as a commercial endeavor to 
 208. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000). 
 209. Nev. Dep’t  of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003). 
 210. Id. at 736 (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: J. Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor 
Standards of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 100 (1986)).  This 
gender discrimination against women in the workplace can coincide with gender 
discrimination against men taking leave.  Martin H. Malin explored this workplace 
hostility toward men and found that “[m]en’s accommodation requests are often met by, 
‘Your wife should handle it.’”  Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 1047, 1077 (1994).  Fathers may also be met with taunts and comments from 
coworkers that a “‘real man’ does not take parental leave.”  Joan Williams, Our Economy of 
Mothers and Others: Women and Economics Revisited, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 411, 
426 (2002).  Malin argues that the FMLA provision forbidding employers from 
interfering with FMLA rights should be applied to combat this discrimination.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2000) (noninterference provision); Malin, supra, at 1090–94.  He 
suggests using the hostile work environment paradigm from Title VII sexual harassment 
cases to hold employers liable for workplace environments that discourage men’s leave-
taking.  This “FMLA hostile work environment” liability would be broader than Title 
VII because the FMLA does not limit illegal discrimination to terms or conditions of 
employment as does Title VII.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 211. See also supra note 33 discussing the hole in FMLA coverage of independent 
contractors and how it disproportionately impacts women. 
 212. See Epstein, supra note 55, at 951. 
 213. Notably, when contract principles are used they are often adhered to even at 
the expense of the public interest.  Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of 
Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 918–19 (1974) (describing the evolution 
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maximize the efficiency of markets, but rather to promote family well-
being in a time of changing workforce.214  Given that the Act was 
created with the nation’s families at the forefront, it is unlikely that 
Congress intended to allow employees to privately relinquish their rights 
to pursue claims in exchange for money.  Such a practice shields employers 
from the public exposure of litigation and amounts to buying a “license 
to discriminate,” which effectively undermines the purposes of the 
FMLA.215  In fact, the DOL referred to an FMLA prohibition on waivers 
as “sound public policy,”216 the soundness of which is bolstered by the 
historically disparate bargaining power between employers and employees.217  
Furthermore, with employee coercion concerns,218 the distinguishing 
features of the FMLA as related to other employment discrimination 
statutes,219 and noted workplace discrimination against women,220 it is 
difficult to accept that Congress intended for binding severance agreement 
waivers under the Act.  Finally, interpreting section 825.220(d) to prohibit 
waivers of both current and prospective rights is entirely consistent with 
the plain meaning of the regulation.221 
Rendering FMLA waivers illegal, however, is perhaps not the only 
acceptable solution.  As some courts have analogized the FMLA to the 
FLSA,222 an approach similar to FLSA enforcement of settlement 
agreements is an option.  An employer who violates the FLSA is liable 
to its employees for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, 
and for an equal amount in liquidated damages,223 but employees may 
of eighteenth-century equitable contract principles into nineteenth-century contract at-
will principles that seek to protect the market economy and commercial interests at the 
expense of the public interest). 
 214. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000). 
 215. See Lussier, supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.  In its amicus brief successfully 
arguing for rehearing in Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., the Secretary took the position 
that section 825.220(d) does not bar the “retrospective settlement of FMLA claims.”  See 
DOL Supplemental Brief, supra note 118, at 4.  In its amicus brief for the rehearing, the 
DOL also claimed that it has never established a system for reviewing “private 
settlement” of FMLA claims, although it admitted that it has “supervised” settlements 
investigated by the Wage and Hour Division.  See DOL Brief, supra note 118. 
 217. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 156, 209, and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 119 and accompanying text, and text at note 118. 
 223. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000). 




not waive FLSA rights in a private employee-employer agreement.224  
Employees may settle or compromise their rights in only two ways: they 
can accept the Secretary of Labor’s supervision of payments of unpaid 
wages owed to them, whereby the employees waive their right to pursue 
claims; or employees may bring suit directly against their employer and 
a district court can enter a stipulated judgment after analyzing a 
proposed settlement.225  Allowing the court to scrutinize the agreement 
increases the likelihood that it “reflect[s] a [more] reasonable compromise 
of disputed issues than a mere waiver of statutory rights brought by an 
employer’s overreaching.”226  If the agreement is reasonable, district 
courts may approve it in order to promote the policy of encouraging 
settlement in litigation.227 
Utilizing the FLSA scheme for DOL and judicial supervision of 
FMLA employer-employee agreements is likely feasible.  The FMLA 
directs the Secretary to attempt to resolve complaints of FMLA 
violations “in the same manner” that the Secretary attempts to resolve 
FLSA settlements.228  The Department, therefore, has the same authority 
to supervise binding settlements and waivers under the FMLA that it has 
 224. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 371, 374 (4th Cir. 2005), aff’d 
on reh’g, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. 
Oct. 22, 2007) (No. 07-539); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 225. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (including procedure for Secretary to supervise payments); 
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that if an employee does not involve the Secretary of Labor, then the “only other 
route” to compromise FLSA claims is through stipulated judgment in a suit against an 
employer under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), in which the court analyzes the proposed agreement 
for fairness).  Employees may not settle for an amount less than what they are owed 
under the statute.  A settlement may also only be binding where there is a bona fide 
dispute over the amount owed or liquidated damages.  See, e.g., Guess v. Montague, 140 
F.2d 500, 504–06 (4th Cir. 1943) (stating that an agreement for less than the minimum 
wage is nonbinding because it contravenes express provisions of the statute, but “there is 
nothing in the statute or in public policy which forbids settlement of the claim for 
liquidated damages at any figure that the parties may agree on”). 
 226. Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354.  Another benefit of a settlement in this 
context, as opposed to a general FMLA waiver, is that the employer may agree as part of 
the negotiated settlement to take “ameliorative steps” related to the underlying FMLA 
complaint that will benefit the remaining workforce.  See Silverstein, supra note 61, at 
486–87 (discussing advantages of negotiated settlements taking place after a complaint 
or administrative charge is filed, as opposed to mere waivers of statutory violations 
before any legal action is instituted). 
 227. Lynn’s Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1354 (refusing to approve agreement where 
employees did not consult lawyers, some could not speak English, employer insinuated 
employees were entitled to no back-pay, and employer noted that past employees 
returned settlement payments from DOL actions because they felt they had already been 
paid what they were due). 
 228. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) (2000) (“The Secretary shall receive, investigate, and 
attempt to resolve complaints of violations of section 2615 of this title in the same 
manner that the Secretary receives, investigates, and attempts to resolve complaints of 
violations of sections 206 and 207 [FLSA provisions] of this title.”). 
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under the FLSA,229 and has exercised these supervisory powers to settle 
FMLA claims.230 
The added responsibilities on the Department of an explicit requirement 
to supervise FMLA claims are also probably manageable, and only a 
slight burden if any at all.  First, DOL enforcement data show that 
employers are at far more risk of violating the FLSA than the FMLA.231  
Second, a majority of employers are complying with the FMLA, which 
lowers their risk of liability and the likelihood that they will insert 
FMLA waiver clauses into severance agreements which might require 
DOL approval.232  Severance agreements with FMLA provisions would 
presumably only be necessary from the employer’s perspective in rare 
situations where significant liability existed.233  Finally, no empirical evidence 
has been presented by organizations opposing such an idea to show that 
FLSA-like supervisory requirements would overwhelm DOL resources.234  
In fact, it can take relatively minimal effort to meet DOL supervisory 
requirements; one court found the requisite supervision where the DOL 
investigated a claim, concluded FMLA back wages were owed, 
forwarded release forms to the employer signed by the employee, and 
 229. See, e.g., Mion v. Aftermarket Tool & Equip. Group, 990 F. Supp. 535, 540 
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (recognizing that, in accordance with § 2617(b), the Secretary has the 
same authority to supervise binding FLSA settlements as it does for FMLA settlements). 
 230. See, e.g., id. (holding that the DOL supervised a settlement of employee’s 
$310.18 FMLA back wage claims, within meaning of FLSA, where DOL provided 
employer with release form, employer forwarded the form to employee along with the 
check, and employee cashed the check and was aware of attached forms). 
 231. In 2003, there were 32,591 concluded FLSA back wages cases.  In the same 
year, there were only 3565 total FMLA complaints for back wages.  U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2003 Statistics Fact Sheet, Wage and Hour Fiscal Year 2003 Enforcement 
Continues Record Climb, available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/200318.htm. 
 232. Supplemental Reply Brief of Appellant at 6, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 
493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525).   In other words, it is not in employers’ 
interests to pay departing employees for FMLA waivers when the risk of liability for 
FMLA violations is low. 
 233. Id. at 7. 
 234. See Supplemental Reply Brief on Panel Rehearing of Amici Curiae the Equal 
Employment Advisory Council et al. at 8–9, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 
454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525) [hereinafter EEAC Reply Brief] (suggesting that a 
DOL approval requirement is unfeasible because DOL has no established system for 
supervising private FMLA settlements); cf. Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae the 
National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) and the North Carolina Academy of 
Trial Lawyers (NCATL) at 7, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 
2007) (No. 04-1525) (responding that if there was any empirical evidence of such 
consequences of FLSA-like enforcement, organizations would have presented them). 




several other communications between the DOL and employer took 
place.235 
Despite the practicality of such a scheme, several organizations claim 
that an FMLA supervision requirement would undermine the preclusive 
effect of general releases, thus lowering the amount employers are 
willing to pay employees for releases236 and decreasing the offering of 
severance agreements.237  This argument rests on the fact that “the 
principal value of a general release is that it eliminates any possibility of 
post-termination litigation” and “facilitat[es] a full and peaceful closure 
of the employment relationship.”238  But a release of all but FMLA 
claims has value to an employer as it precludes the possibility of other 
litigation, and has overarching value to the public by way of holding 
employers accountable for FMLA noncompliance.  The fact that the 
amount paid for the release, not including FMLA claims, is lower than 
that of an all-encompassing release also does not necessarily harm 
employees; employees are worse off if they sign a release for claims that 
would yield a larger payment if pursued.  Furthermore, the approval 
requirement does not prevent employers from drafting a separate FMLA 
agreement for approval that accompanies the general release of all other 
claims.  Finally, facilitating a “full and peaceful” end to the employment 
relationship should not come at the expense of a fair resolution of FMLA 
violations, as adjudged by DOL or court supervision.  In all, the possible 
negative consequences of implementing a DOL or court supervision 
requirement are likely overcome by the public policies in favor of the 
approach.  Protecting vulnerable employees from overreaching employers, 
protecting the interests of families in times of need, and strengthening 
the deterrent effect of the FMLA almost certainly compensate for any 
imperfections in the process. 
 235. Mion, 990 F. Supp. at 540 (noting that the “other communications” included a 
letter, fax, phone call, and one other communication); see also Cuevas v. Monroe St. 
City Club, 752 F. Supp. 1405, 1416 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding under FLSA that there was 
adequate supervision where DOL met with employer, received employer correspondence, and 
DOL supplied release forms); Torreblanca v. Naas Foods, Inc., No. F 78-163, 1980 WL 
2100, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (holding there was adequate supervision under FLSA 
where employer treasurer and Secretary of Labor compliance officer exchanged a visit, 
memorandum, phone call, and letter). 
 236. The lowered amount is a supposed result of possible FMLA liability still 
existing. 
 237. EEAC Reply Brief, supra note 234.  The organizations also claim that the 
offering of severance agreements would surely decrease with such a rule because 
employers would fear the possibility of added expense of defending suits if they could 
not know that they would not be subjected to post-termination litigation.  They also 
suggest that in mass layoffs, employees are likely to be worse off because they would not 
receive any financial relief. 
 238. Id. 
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A third approach, perhaps a middle approach between making waivers 
illegal and implementing an FLSA-like scheme, is to require that FMLA 
waivers meet explicit requirements.239  This could resemble the OWBPA 
requirements that Congress enacted to protect older workers from 
waiving their rights under ADEA.240  Like the FLSA supervision framework, 
requiring a heightened standard for waivers would work to ensure the 
agreement is fundamentally fair to the employee, and would abate 
concerns of coercion and weak bargaining power accompanying general 
 239. An approach not endorsed by this Comment is mandatory arbitration of FMLA 
claims.  Employment arbitration has drawbacks similar to those of FMLA waivers.  As 
Richard A. Bales notes in his discussion of mandatory arbitration clauses pertaining to 
all employee disputes, arbitration notably fails to deter discrimination.  First, arbitration 
reduces the cost of defending a suit, which makes employers less wary of violating the 
Act.  Second, it leads to confidential outcomes which have a host of negative 
consequences related to compliance and deterrence of discrimination, as discussed supra 
at notes 135 through 140.  Arbitration also undermines employees’ right to a jury that 
they would otherwise have in a civil suit.  Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of 
Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 359–66 (2006).  
The advantages of arbitration include speed, lower cost than litigation, and for those who 
cannot afford representation by an attorney, access to dispute resolution.  Id. at 353–57.  
However, the DOL or court approval scheme, or explicit statutory requirements 
suggested by this Comment, also offer these advantages without the serious concerns 
associated with arbitration.  For example, the DOL scheme may delay the enforcement 
of a waiver, but it allows the DOL to track compliance and is not costly (at least 
monetarily) to the employee. 
 240. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000).  An individual may not waive an OWBPA right or 
claim unless: (1) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the 
employer that is “written in a manner calculated to be understood by the individual, or by 
the average individual eligible to participate”; (2) the waiver specifically refers to rights 
or claims arising under ADEA; (3) the individual does not waive rights or claims that 
may arise after the date the waiver is executed; (4) the individual waives rights or claims 
only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the 
individual already is entitled; (5) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an 
attorney prior to executing the agreement; (6) (a) the individual is given at least twenty-
one days to consider the agreement, or (b) the individual is given at least forty-five days 
to consider it if the waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other 
employment termination program offered to a group of employees; (7) the agreement is 
revocable for at least seven days following its execution, and is not effective or 
enforceable until the revocation period expires; (8) if the waiver is in connection with an 
exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group of 
employees, the employer informs the individual in writing in a manner calculated to be 
understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to (a) any class or group 
of individuals covered by the program and any eligibility factors or time limits 
applicable to the program, and (b) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or 
selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or 
unit who are not eligible or selected for the program. 




FMLA waivers.241  Requiring that the agreement specifically refer to 
FMLA rights would also minimize concerns that employees are waiving 
rights which they did not realize existed.242  However, implementing 
requirements similar to those of OWBPA does not serve the public 
policy goals of increasing FMLA compliance and promoting the 
interests of families as much as a complete ban on waivers, or a DOL or 
court approval requirement.243  The scheme allows for situations where 
employees never learn that a departing employee received compensation 
for FMLA violations.  This limited knowledge may dissuade remaining 
employees from asserting their own rights to medical and family leave.  
Also, it is probably unlikely that most employees encouraged to seek 
legal advice before signing a waiver will do so, considering that 
employees who took leave likely face financial difficulties.244 
It is important to note that making waivers illegal, FLSA-like 
supervision, or explicit waiver requirements do not preclude a settlement 
of claims after a complaint is filed or litigation is commenced.  The 
differences between a waiver and these options are significant.  When an 
employee signs a waiver abdicating the right to pursue any claims she 
may have against her employer, it is unlikely she has retained an 
attorney to advise her on the consequences or fairness of the agreement.  
On the other hand, in a litigation settlement context an employee will 
most likely be represented by an attorney who can guide the negotiations 
 241. Such requirements for FMLA waivers are similar to procedural requirements 
suggested for use in other types of agreements, as well.  See, e.g., Karen Servidea, Note, 
Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the State’s Interest in Marriage, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 535, 576 (2005).  The author argues that concerns of bounded rationality in 
enforcement of postnuptial agreements could be lessened by procedural requirements of 
waiting periods, marital counseling, and independent legal advice.  This would ensure 
that the parties rationally analyze the risks of the contract, while not unnecessarily 
infringing on the parties’ freedom to contract. 
 242. See supra note 155 and accompanying text, discussing the DOL survey that 
showed a majority of employees have heard of the FMLA, but about half do not know 
whether the law applies to them. 
 243. It is interesting to note that Congress decided to apply the heightened waiver 
requirements only to older workers under ADEA, and not to female or minority workers 
protected under Title VII.  Congress contended that older workers “may be manipulated 
or even coerced into signing away their ADEA protections,” and in contexts of 
“voluntary” exit incentives they “have little or no reason to suspect that their employer is 
a potential adversary.”  H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 24 (1990).  However, the manipulation and 
coercion concerns are also present in the FMLA context, as is the presence of employees 
ignorant of their FMLA rights who do not realize that an employer is potentially liable to 
them.  See supra note 155 and accompanying text, discussing the survey showing that 
half of employees do not know whether the FMLA applies to them.  For more on the 
OWBPA requirements and the view that they are Congress’s response to the 
shortcomings of the totality of the circumstances waiver test, see Senn, supra note 68. 
 244. See supra note 163 and accompanying text, discussing the financial hardship 
that often afflicts leave-takers. 
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and ensure that the decision is fully informed and in the best interest of 
the employee.  Both the anti-waiver approach and supervision requirements 
ensure that an employer’s greater bargaining power does not overwhelm 
the employee, and waiver requirements may lessen the effects of disparate 
bargaining power.  Also, where a severance agreement waiver is likely 
signed on the employer’s “turf,” the employee agreeing to a settlement 
has the advantage of distance from her workplace, which may foster 
more rational and less emotional analysis.  Finally, settlement agreements 
sometimes include provisions whereby the employer promises to takes 
steps to ameliorate the alleged violations of employee rights, which 
could enhance compliance with FMLA provisions.245 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A compelling need exists to uphold the integrity of the FMLA and 
protect the rights of employees when they are weakest and most 
vulnerable to employer overreaching, such as when facing trying family 
events stemming from medical crises.  Uninformed or emotional 
employees are at risk of exploitation from the unscrupulous employers 
which are inevitable in the workplace.  It is unlikely that a severance 
agreement waiving FMLA rights will constitute a fair bargain benefiting 
the nation’s families where employees are likely tending to essential 
needs at home, are not fully aware of their FMLA rights, and have a 
noted lack of bargaining power.  Even more importantly, individual 
private FMLA waivers diminish the rights that other employees perceive 
the Act to afford.  The more that coworkers witness uncompensated or 
unsanctioned violations of FMLA rights, the more likely the employees 
are to yield rather than assert the rights to which they are entitled.  Thus, 
waivers give obvious incentives for employers to violate the Act.  
Fostering employee acquiescence to these violations hardly encourages 
utilization of leave options so that employee-family members may 
participate in early childrearing or care for seriously ill family members.  
Endorsing waivers actually discourages use of leave options, which in 
 245. See supra note 226, discussing Silverstein, supra note 61, at 486.  A severance 
agreement will contain no ameliorative provision as they are largely form contracts 
provided by the employer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  See David Sherwyn, Samuel 
Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New 
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563–64 (2005) (noting that rarely 
negotiated policies also include health insurance, life insurance, pension plans, 
noncompetition agreements, vacation pay, and mandatory arbitration). 




turn hinders efforts to minimize the potential for employment discrimination246 
and simply does not promote the stability of families.247 
The anti-waiver approach of illegalizing FMLA waivers advances 
many public policy aims and is an appropriate interpretation of section 
825.220(d).  A viable alternative, rather than the anti-waiver approach, is 
to require a court or the DOL to supervise a proposed severance agreement 
waiver for fairness.  This scheme does not impossibly stretch any administrative 
framework; 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b) explicitly states that FMLA complaints 
of violations should be resolved “in the same manner” as FLSA complaints 
are resolved,248 and the DOL has supervised waivers in the past.249  The 
least that can be done to better protect employees and the effectiveness of 
the Act itself is to implement strict waiver requirements, perhaps similar to 
those in OWBPA, to safeguard employees’ well-being.250  Changing 
nothing and treating FMLA waivers as ordinary private contracts is not a 
well-reasoned path, as in the end waivers serve to reestablish the choice 
for employees between “the job they need and the family they love.”251 
 
 246. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000) (including among FMLA purposes the goal to “to 
minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring 
generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related 
disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis . . . .”). 
 247. The statute provides: 
Congress finds that . . . it is important for the development of children and the 
family unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing 
and the care of family members who have serious health conditions . . . .  It is 
the purpose of this Act to . . . balance the demands of the workplace with the 
needs of families, . . . to promote national interests in preserving family 
integrity . . . [and] to entitle employees to take reasonable leave . . . for the care 
of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition. 
Id. § 2601(a)–(b). 
 248. Id. § 2617(b); see supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 251. Clinton Signing Statement, supra note 25. 
